Observatorium 86 – Civil Society in Slovakia 2024-2025: Resisting an Authoritarian Turn

Observatorium 86 I November 2025 |

by Boris Strecansky

The Act on Non-Profit Organizations was amended in May 2025. Can Civil Society Resist an Authoritarian Turn?

The fourth Fico government took office in November 2023. Since then, there has been a noticeable shift in Slovak foreign policy, heightened polarization and deterioration of the information space, regressive development in the rule of law, and a significant shrinking of civic space. The overall development can be characterized as a gradual discreditation of the liberal democratic regime, shifting towards an electoral democracy of the Hungarian style, and an autocratization trend[1] driven by power politics that concentrates political and economic power in clientelist, narrowly partisan, and clan-like networks, thereby removing participatory and deliberative elements from public life and policymaking. It is then not surprising when the Prime Minister Fico publicly questions liberal democracy and political pluralism as a less economically and politically viable model compared to other alternatives, showing as an example Vietnam, Uzbekistan, and China that achieve socio-economic development without that many political parties.[2]

Changing Foreign Policy Orientation

Slovak foreign policy rhetoric has shifted towards signaling friendly gestures and an orientation towards authoritarian leaders, such as Putin or Xi, demonstrating allegiance and understanding of their interests.[3][4] Prime Minister Fico met Vladimir Putin twice – in December 2024 and in May 2025 and in his statements adopts the Russian narrative on the war-mongering EU and often tries to water down EU efforts to assist Kyiv and impose sanctions in Ukraine.[5]4 In January, the vice-chairman of the National Council, Tibor Gašpar, admitted that Slovakia could leave the EU and NATO.[6]

On the EU turf, this meant aligning positions in the European Council with Hungary and disrupting unity on matters such as sanctions against Russia, energy security, support for Ukraine,[7] and diluting efforts for strengthening democratic processes in the Near Neighborhood (Moldova, Georgia). In these decisions, the narrowly perceived national interest of Slovakia was put forward, often in solidarity with the interests of Russia and in the relativization of the suffering of attacked Ukraine, ignoring or entirely disregarding European values. High-level officials are not shy to name the calls for help for the invaded and destroyed Ukraine by the barbaric Putin regime as begging. This contributed to some alienation of Slovakia among its long-term allies in the EU and NATO and Slovakia’s movement to the fringes within these groupings.[8]

Polarization

Slovakia has also experienced an unprecedented level of political violence, exemplified in an assassination attempt on the Prime Minister in May 2024, which indicates heightened levels of polarization. This has a direct effect on shrinking civic space. The political intention to shrink space for freedom of association and assembly was executed by adopting the amendment to the Act on Non-Profit Organizations in May 2025, and the “Lex Assassination” in 2024 that constrained protest and accountability.[9] The political polarization in Slovakia is considered one of the highest in international comparisons in different rankings (V-Dem 2025, Edelman Polarization Score). Recent analysis of the causes of heightened polarization suggests that it is a combination of the following factors: attractiveness of polarizing leaders who offer black and white reasoning and clear-cut truths, economic inequality or poverty, poor governance and management in crisis situations, hollowing the political middle ground and strengthening of radical left or right, fragmented geopolitical identity of Slovaks, high level of skepticism towards international organizations with strong nostalgia for communism, the absence of a common story and collective identity of the polity, disinformation and influence of social media.[10]

Disinformation

Polarization has been closely connected to disinformation, which was also a salient feature of Slovak public life during 2024 and 2025. Opposition political parties, independent media, so called ‘political’ NGOs and ordinary citizens who have shown a public attitude that questioned the legitimacy of the new power holders have been frequently portrayed as ‘enemies’ of ordinary people and mercenaries of foreign powers trying to undermine the stability and development in Slovakia, plunging it into chaos and disorder.[11][12][13][14] The critique of any government action or decision has become a pretext for vilification and aggressive rhetoric aimed at the author of the critique – be it a journalist, media, NGO, or a citizen, regardless of the substance in question.

This meant not only an increased frequency of disinformation and the spreading of the pro-Russian narratives.[15] It meant also increased intensity of attacks and attempts of public discrediting and delegitimizing civic organizations and their leaders, while adopting policies and legislation aimed at curbing civic voice in public policy making to get rid of critical voices publicly questioning the ruling coalition’s policies and decisions. In January 2025 the political leaders, such as the Prime Minister Fico, Minister of the Interior Matúš Šutaj-Eštok, and the head of the Slovak Information Service Pavol Gašpar, launched a barrage of vilification and stigmatization of CSOs as foreign agents and alleged coup d’état plotters connected with the Georgian Legion.8

Independent media

Besides attacks on civil society, there has been a power grab of the public media. This was preceded by the institutional overhaul by administrative action which abolished the previous public service broadcaster (RTVS) and established a new entity (STVR). This step raised concerns about the autonomy of public service media because, by replacing key personnel, the public service media’s ability to question those in power became less sharp. Additionally, there was pressure on private broadcasters, exerted through curbing advertising investments. Since the takeover of the government, the public arena has been inundated with disinformation and misinformation spread not only by disinformation outlets and social media but also directly by high-level government officials in numerous press conferences and statements on behalf of state institutions, which a primed audience on social media has actively endorsed.[16]3[17]For CSOs, fewer impartial platforms mean narrower access to audiences for evidence-based campaigns, fact-checking, minority voices, and fundraising appeals. CSOs report more reliance on social media and local outlets, increasing outreach costs and exposure to online harassment.[18]

Regressive Informal Normalization

Besides the structural changes in policies, laws and institutional reforms, there is also a looming disruption and contempt of unwritten rules and norms of parliamentarism and political culture that normalize behavior otherwise unacceptable. Speech in the public space is vulgarized, family members of political opponents and critical journalists face attacks from the very people who have not rid themselves of serious suspicions of conflicts of interest from public office or its abuse. The Prime Minister provides financial contributions from his personal reserve to disinformation media.[19] He also met with Norbert Bodor, an oligarch who has been indicet in the ‘Purgartory‘ case, several times in his office. In this case, he is suspected of having founded a criminal group within the police during the former Smer governments, together with former police president and current Smer deputy speaker Tibor Gašpar. According to the indictment, they abused the police for Smer’s political goals and to discredit opponents, allegations which they both deny.[20]

Weaponization of Institutions

Last, but not least, the key political development affecting CSOs has been the weaponization of institutions against civil society. Especially in 2025, sweeping audits are being conducted in CSOs that have managed public funds and are somehow connected to those NGOs that are considered as ‘malevolent’. There are many press conferences of high-level state bureaucrats accusing and publicly defaming people and NGOs, or making unsubstantiated allegations, launching investigations, calling NGO representatives for interrogations by the police, and personalized attacks in the media against individuals on trumped-up charges (Laco Miko, Marta Šimečková, Lucia Stasselova).

Rule of Law and Civil Society

The third crucial contextual development was the deterioration of the rule of law, which was flagged by the EU’s 2025 Rule of Law Report.[21] This also included the adoption of laws that further constrained the civic space for civil society organizations to operate.

Since the new government took office at the end of 2023, civil society and NGOs have been repeatedly targeted by the political parties SNS and SMER-SD. The anti-NGO sentiment was first openly invoked in early 2024 by the ruling coalition’s MPs, who proposed legislation to label NGOs as foreign agents in the form of a draft law on „foreign influence“. NGOs were assigned unfair intentions due to foreign support. The bill was not pursued as the legislative initiative encountered some procedural hurdles and was in breach of EU law.

The stigmatization of civil society continued in the public arena in early 2025 when the top officials of the government fabricated serious accusations against students, activists, and ordinary citizens for planning a coup d’état to intimidate them and make them targets of public outcry. At the same time, the real purpose was to divert public attention from other serious public policy issues, such as fiscal consolidation or public outcry over contemplating Slovakia’s departure from the EU by the top government official[22].

Next, in Spring 2025, the pressure continued, resulting in the so-called „Russian law“, which amended Law No. 213/1997 on non-profit organizations. The amendment is chicanery in nature, discriminates and undermines the right to free association, violates the right to privacy and donors‘ data protection rights, and restricts freedom of expression. Both proposals have created an image of the enemy within to develop further the narrative of defending the state against its perpetrators and to distract the public and the media from the real problems by inventing threats to which such legislation then appears to respond (e.g. accusing NGOs of preparing a coup or of embezzlement or wasteful use of public funds). The amendment to NGO law that came into force in June 2025 is harassing in nature, discriminates against and undermines the right to freedom of association, violates the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data of donors and members of non-profit organizations, and restricts freedom of expression. In justifying it, representatives of some political parties and government institutions portrayed non-governmental non-profit organizations as an internal enemy and justified the adoption of the law on the grounds that the state must protect itself from pests – ergo non-governmental non-profit organizations that express their views on public issues and engage in public debate. It is symptomatic that the law was not consulted with non-governmental non-profit organizations, but was created through extensive amendments to the original draft directly in parliament, just two hours before the relevant committee meeting. The law is, according to multiple lawyers, a violation of the Freedom of Association in the Constitution, as well as Article 12 of the EU Charter and Article 11 of the European Covenant on Human Rights. Also, the Equal Treatment Principle is violated as companies that receive public funds, as well, are not defined as “obliged persons” as NGOs.

Defunding of CSOs

On the level of resourcing CSOs, the most important developments were the funding delays and cancellations of calls for proposals in the fields of human rights (Ministry of Justice), culture (Ministry of Culture) and environment (Ministry of Environment). Some calls were adjusted so that CSOs have been taken out as eligible applicants (in the Envirofond and Green Education Fund).[23] Some funding schemes, such as the Art Council, were recalibrated and their priorities were reframed to make some originally eligible CSO recipients ineligible. It is unofficially estimated that the overall cuts in funding earmarked for CSOs amount to 15 million EUR.

During the reporting period, numerous cases were reported of the state deciding not to support civil society organizations (CSOs) with trumped-up arguments, thereby violating its own rules and mechanisms and limiting CSOs‘ equal access to state subsidies. LGBTI+, human rights, and cultural CSOs have mostly experienced discrimination when accessing public subsidies. Similar developments were observed in the Victims of Violence Support Program for 2025. The Ministry of Justice excluded two civil society organizations (CSOs), Inakosť and the Human Rights League, from the program without legal grounds and without including them in the assessment procedure. (Amnesty Slovakia, 2025).

However, during that period, there were also frequent and noticeable attacks on CSOs receiving foreign funding, carried out by the state-supported media or government officials. These attacks accused the CSOs of potentially harming Slovakia and pursuing anti-Slovak interests. Often, these attacks promoted the idea that foreign funding is inherently harmful and is intended to cause chaos and spread misinformation (Fulek, 2025; Šutaj Eštok, 2025).

Nonprofit organizations (CSOs) have used fundraising platforms and mechanisms, such as Donio.sk, Darujme.sk, Startlab.sk, Dobry Anjel, and Ludialudom.sk. The amount of money raised on these websites increases steadily every year (Centrum pre filantropiu, 2025). However, new rules introduced by the „Russian Law“ have made it more difficult for CSOs to raise money. These new rules require more paperwork and reporting, making the process more complicated[24]. The new requirements will take effect in the second half of 2025, so their full impact won’t be seen until 2026. By then, CSOs will have gained experience with the necessary compliance practices.

Response of civil society

The most significant observable responses by Slovak CSOs to recent political, social, and economic pressures have been the nationwide but decentralized protests that mobilized tens of thousands against democratic backsliding and the restrictive NGO law[25]. Demonstrations—often coordinated by civic coalitions—became the largest since 2018, with strong student, cultural, and regional participation. CSOs such as Peace for Ukraine[26] and grassroots platforms such as “Not in Our Town”[27] organized mass demonstrations across Slovakia, including in Bratislava, Košice, and over 40 other towns—as well as mobilizing Slovak diaspora communities abroad against justice reforms, the Kremlin-leaning foreign policy line, and the April 2025 NGO bill.[28] Protest slogans like “Slovakia is Europe” were widely used. CSOs coordinated messaging, legal monitoring, and volunteer efforts—strengthening communication pipelines between urban and regional actors. Not in Our Town maintained weekly demonstrations even in smaller towns like Banská Bystrica, often under adverse conditions like threats and surveillance.[29][30] Ultimately, these campaigns set a counter-narrative to governmental disempowerment efforts and helped project civil society’s continuity amid institutional threats. Protests also served to build resilience: reinforcing collective identity, raising awareness, and training new campaigners.

Besides public protests, there is also a visible response and adaptation among affected CSOs at the organizational level. Some CSOs responded by investing in security protocols, legal insurance, and digital safety training—costs rarely covered by project grants. The development prompted NGOs to professionalize their protection efforts while seeking alliances with international networks. The risk climate has also discouraged some community partners (schools, local councils) from co-hosting events, narrowing outreach.[31] Also, cuts in originally promised funding limited planned activities.[32] Philanthropic intermediaries report growing demand for rapid response funds for legal defense and well-being.

On the organizational level, CSOs believe that the new requirements introduced by the “Russian Law” will impose additional workload on their staff and increase financial pressures, as the compliance processes will require extra personnel costs. Some online giving portals and system administrators are also trying to assist their CSO clients in complying more easily with the new rules by updating their data dashboards so clients will receive data in the required format[33] (Donio, 2025).

At the sectoral and policy level, there are visible advocacy efforts of the Chamber of NGOs in the Governmental Council for NGOs[34] and even more visible Platform for Democracy[35] in convening the CSOs and speaking in one voice by preparing an open letter to the government which set red lines on open government, transparency, access to information, and fair grant rules. It was publicly issued under the Platform for Democracy and co-signed by over 500 of organisations and leaders.[36][37]

Future outlook

Whether the civil society, in the form of autonomous associative spaces and polis in the sense of a political community together with ‘agora’ – an independent public space in Slovakia, will be able to resist the increasingly intense attacks is an open question.

The example of Hungary shows that the long-lasting influence of propaganda and a hostile state can lead to civic passivity, self-censorship, and even apathy. Nevertheless, the insight that where a ‘polis’ has already been established, its destruction is brutal and will not happen overnight can be a hopeful one. Such hope is also nourished by the manifestations of active civil society that we observe in the form of non-violent civil protests in Georgia, Ukraine, and Serbia, but also in smaller towns and cities in Slovakia in the form of active networks and organizers of civil protests and rallies. The polis is struggling with authoritarian forces over the nature of the state. Democratic political parties will have to play a crucial role in this struggle.

Boris Strecansky is a Senior Expert at the Centrum pre filantropiu n.o. (Center for Philanthropy) in Bratislava, Slovakia.

[1] Lindberg 2025. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/60/V-dem-dr__2025_lowres.pdf

[2] DenníkN. 2025. https://dennikn.sk/minuta/4683791/

[3] TASR 2025. https://europeannewsroom.com/fico-i-consider-it-a-mistake-that-representatives-of-eu-states-ignored-the-celebrations-in-china/

[4] The Associated Press 2024. https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-slovakia-fico-talks-45e08385f245bff9df02d6b533561598

[5] Giordano 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/robert-fico-shakes-vladimir-putin-hand-as-russias-war-victory-parade-kicks-off/

[6] Pekárková 2025. https://spravy.stvr.sk/2025/01/na-vyrok-tibora-gaspara-o-moznom-vystupeni-z-eu-a-nato-reagoval-prezident-pellegrini-vladny-hlas-aj-opozicia/

[7] Reuters 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/slovak-leader-fico-sets-conditions-backing-more-russia-sanctions-2025-09-11 /

[8] Rutte 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_233396.htm

[9] OHCHR 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/experts-alarmed-deterioration-fundamental-freedoms-and-civic-space-slovak

[10] Kosnáčet et. al. 2025. https://www.dekk.institute/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Polarizacia-a-antisystem-Slovensko-2025.pdf

[11] Gluck 2025. https://www.facebook.com/GluckRichard/videos/2908321879346285?locale=sk_SK

[12] Lorincová & Pietová 2025. https://sita.sk/simecka-vyleti-ako-certik-z-krabicky-vzdy-ked-sa-hovori-o-financovani-mimovladok-skonstatoval-premier-fico/

[13] Osvaldová 2025. https://dennikn.sk/4440748/fico-neukazal-dokazy-ma-len-dve-fotografie-z-facebooku-status-z-x-a-nejasnych-150-tisic-eur/

[14] Príbelský 2025. https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/W8a6NFy/robert-fico-utoci-na-studenta-omanika-ktory-prezidentovi-nepodal-ruku-nazyva-ho-nevycvalanym-pubertiakom/

[15] NEST Institute 2024. https://www.nest-institute.org/analyzy/slovensky-telegram-ticha-invazia-manipulacii-a-propagandy/

[16] Gedra 2025. https://www.facebook.com/JurajGedra.SK/videos/2294391810961978?locale=sk_SK

[17] Šálek 2024. https://sita.sk/fico-oznacil-media-a-mimovladky-za-tych-ktori-najviac-skodia-krajine-a-kritizoval-aj-opoziciu-video/

[18] Sekhniashvili 2025. https://ipi.media/slovakia-media-capture-deepens-as-government-tightens-grip-on-public-and-private-media/

[19] SITA 2025a. https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/746004-dezinfoweby-dostanu-z-ficovej-rezervy-desattisice-eur/

[20] Hajčáková 2025. https://domov.sme.sk/c/23475206/v-marci-sa-fico-pre-otazky-o-navsteve-bodora-rozculoval-teraz-sa-chvali-zabermi-z-uradu-vlady.html

[21] European Commission 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/a717b80d-1631-4fa1-8aeb-7e423c207948_en?filename=2025%20Rule%20of%20Law%20Report_country-abstract%20and%20recommendations.pdf

[22]Franková 2025. https://spravy.stvr.sk/2025/01/clenstvo-slovenska-v-eu-a-nato-by-mohlo-byt-zakotvene-v-ustave-navrhuje-strana-sas/

[23] TASR 2024. https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/GUh9Tfm/neziskove-organizacie-kritizuju-zmeny-fungovania-fondov-tomas-taraba-hovori-o-priorite-podporit-skoly/

[24] Civicus Monitor 2025, 5. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/large-and-sustained-protests-against-governments-pro-russian-stance-and-foreign-agent-law/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[25] ta3. 2025, May 9. https://www.ta3.com/clanok/993427/jedenasty-protest-na-namesti-slobody-bol-zatial-posledny-davame-si-pauzu-chceme-sa-nadychnut-hovoria-organizatori

[26] https://www.mierukrajine.sk/

[27] https://www.facebook.com/NIEvBB/

[28] SITA 2025c. https://domov.sme.sk/c/23458255/protesty-slovensko-je-europa-7-3-2025-zoznam-miest.html

[29] Ballová 2025. https://mybystrica.sme.sk/c/23457025/dovody-na-protesty-stale-nepominuli-odkazuju-tisicky-ludi-zhromazdenych-v-banskej-bystrici.html

[30] Zigová 2025 https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/W181eYe/z-protestu-v-banskej-bystrici-ziaden-respekt-ani-ucta-robite-z-nas-terce-znelo-od-studentky-na-adresu-premiera/

[31] Niková 2025. https://www.startitup.sk/stat-ma-preverovat-besedy-zdruzenia-hoaxy-a-podvody-zalozil-ho-byvaly-policajt-a-asistent-poslanca-ps/

[32] Labajová 2025. https://www.postbellum.sk/buducnost-vzdelavacich-programov-post-bellum-je-v-ohrozeni/

[33] Darujme.sk Newsletter, June 2025.

[34] https://www.facebook.com/people/Komora-MNO/61577554079314/.

[35] https://www.predemokraciu.sk/