Observatorium 87 – Between Repression and Resilience: The Civil Society Struggle in Turkey
Observatorium 87 I November 2025 |
by John McManus
For more than a decade, voices inside and outside Turkey have warned of an escalating crackdown on civil society. Political interference in the judiciary, mass detentions and violent suppression of peaceful protests have become defining features of public life. Broad anti-terror laws now enable arbitrary prosecutions, the closure of civic groups and the dismissal and imprisonment of opposition politicians—most recently Istanbul’s mayor and likely future presidential candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu. As the AKP’s rule grows more authoritarian, Turkey’s civil society stands at a critical crossroads.
To assess the current context and consider future prospects, the Maecenata Foundation convened an event on 15 September 2025. It took place under the rubric of its series on ‘backsliding democracy’ — exploring the global assault on democracy in varying contexts.[1] Three speakers took part: Dr Sinem Adar, an Associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Emrah Gürsel, a civil society and philanthropy professional who has for over two decades played critical roles in Turkish civil society organizations and Dr Bilge Yabancı, Assistant Professor at the University of Deusto in Bilbao.
Turkey challenges the liberal assumption that ‘civil society’ is inherently pluralistic or democratic. Despite the presence of democratic voices, a significant number of civil society organisations reflect and uphold a worldview consistent with that of the government—one characterised by authoritarianism, essentialism and limited tolerance for dissent. Yet as the speakers underlined, it is essential to move beyond simplistic binaries in understanding Turkish civil society: not merely as a contest between regime instruments and repressed victims, or between secular and religious actors. Organisations promote diverse, often competing, visions of the public good— sometimes in inventive formulations and alliances. For those opposing the government, this increasingly demands creative and courageous strategies.
Turkey has a long, variegated history of civil society activity. The country has been a multi-party democracy for 75 years. Over the course of that time, civil society actors have frequently come under pressure, cast as threats to national security or state power (Yabanci 2023, 34). Democracy in Turkey has also suffered grave assaults, most notably military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and a ‘post-modern’ coup in 1997, when the military pressured a coalition government to resign and prominent Islamist officials — including Istanbul’s then-mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — were jailed or banned.
Despite these attacks, civil society in Turkey has proven resilient and adapatable. There is a strong commitment to elections, with an average voter turnout over 80%, the highest among OECD countries (OECD 2024). Across Turkey, long-standing grassroots networks, some originating in the 1960s and 1970s, remain visible today in the mobilisation of citizens through trade unions, student groups, and similar organisations. Beginning in the 1990s, movements representing Kurdish, feminist, and Islamist groupings emerged, pushing for recognition and involvement both in society and politics. Such groups were frequently — sometimes violently — opposed, but nevertheless endure (Yabanci 2023, 35). From 2002 to 2007, the proliferation of civil society actors deepened in the AKP’s first term in power, in part due to reforms prompted by Turkey’s formal admission to the EU accession process (Atalay 2022, 3).
Whose civil society?
Entering the 2010s, the AKP increasingly steered Turkey away from democratic rule towards a ‘competitive authoritarian’ system, where elections continued but government capture of media and state institutions made opposition victory increasingly difficult (Esen and Gumuscu 2016). Organisations whose work conflicted with the government’s blend of Sunni Islam, market liberalism, state authority, and social conservatism — such as those promoting LGBTQ+ rights, human rights, environmental or minority causes — were routinely criticised and repressed (Civicus Monitor 2025).
Yet despite increased state coercion, under the AKP the number of civil society organisations has grown. From 2002 to 2018, there was a roughly 50% increase in registered associations (dernekler) and 13% growth in foundations (vakıflar) (Yabanci 2019, 285–86). What explains the rise?
One answer is that some of the victims of repression have been galvanised into a backlash. Over the past 15 years, Turkish courts have been politicised through the appointment of pro-regime judges (Esen 2025). In 2017, the shift to a presidential system marginalised the Turkish parliament, consolidating authority within the executive branch (Adar et al. 2021). Civil society remains one of the few remaining arenas where those wishing to voice opposition can still do so.
Yet rising opposition alone does not account for this growth. Equally significant is the expansion of a broad network of civil society organisations affiliated with the AKP. In 2002, the newly-founded AKP’s election victory brought Turkey its first majority government led by a religiously conservative party. Upon taking office, it confronted a state apparatus, establishment, and segments of the population that viewed it as a threat to the republic’s secular foundations— established in 1923 and long defended by self-appointed guardians.[2] The AKP’s governance faced significant pushback. In 2007, millions took part in protests against the party’s candidate for president and a fear of creeping ‘Islamisation’ (Smith 2007). In 2008, the AKP survived by just one vote a Constitutional Court case that sought to dissolve it and ban its senior figures from politics (Human Rights Watch 2008).
In this context, the AKP and its supporters pursued a multifaceted approach to the civil sphere. They founded new organisations—particularly for women, youth and diaspora audiences such as the Women and Democracy Association (KADEM), the Turkish Youth Foundation (TÜGVA), and the Union of Turkish Democrats— and strengthened older Islamist foundations like the Ensar Foundation and The Society for the Dissemination of Knowledge (İlim Yayma Cemiyeti) (Yabanci 2025, 215–23). At the time, people debated whether these activites were a step toward a more inclusive civic sphere, or simply an attempt to replace dissenting voices with loyal ones.
By the 2010s, Government resources became increasingly channelled towards organisations aligned with the AKP’s worldview, creating a symbiotic relationship between state and pro-government civil society. Party officials held positions on the boards of key organisations, while figures from the sector moved into government or party leadership. Local authorities run by the AKP provided venues, logistics and media visibility for pro-government groups, whose events received favourable coverage—unlike those of critical organisations, which were largely ignored or framed as a threat (Atalay 2022).
This ‘pro-government’ civil society sector largely rejects the language of rights-based claim-making familiar to international civil society discourse. Instead, they operate by such means as providing charity, running (public) services and the implementation of socio-cultural policies shaped by Sunni Islamic-conservative values. They are allowed to be ‘political’ so far as it comes to mobilising support for the AKP and its candidates, particularly in the run-up to elections (Atalay 2022, 3; Adak 2021).
The creation of a pro-regime civil society sector in Turkey is an example of how contemporary competitive autocracies often avoid relying solely on repression. The Turkish state is dependent on these organisations for the more culturally-focused edge of its vision. In return, as Yabancı notes, the organisations ‘incessantly seek benefits and perks’ (Yabanci 2025, 88). Consequently, they should be viewed not as puppets of the regime but as ‘shareholders’ (Atalay 2022, 2) or ‘trustworthy allies’ (Yabanci 2025, 87), forming a strong bond around a shared ideological agenda.
The opposition fights back
Civil society groups in Turkey that diverge from the government’s agenda now operate from a position of disadvantage. But it is important not to assume that they are done. Emrah Gürsel cited a 2025 report from the Third Sector Foundation of Türkiye (TÜSEV). Across the 20 years from 2004 to 2024, donations to charitable institutions have risen — from 18% to 35%. The average amount per donation has also increased eight-fold in real terms (Çarkoğlu and Ertan 2025, 13). What makes the rise all the more surprising is that it has occured while Turkey has battled currency depreciation, double-digit inflation and a slide in real purchasing power. The increase is visible across both ‘pro-’ and ‘anti-’ government civil society, suggesting that belief in the sustenance of civil society organisations is not limited to a specific demographic (Ibid. 2025, 68–70).
While pro-government civil society enjoys broad freedom of action, oppositional groups have been compelled to engage in what Bilge Yabancı describes as ‘tactful contention’ (Yabanci 2025, 10). Classic tactics such as protests, strikes and demonstrations do still occur. Yet amid the shifting and unpredictable landscape of repression in Turkey —where laws and their interpretation change without warning—opposition actors have had to become increasingly nimble. A variety of methods are used to advance civic goals, including innovative social media campaigns, civil disobedience, organising public citizen assemblies, monitoring elections, boycotts, lobbying and legal action (Ibid. 2025, 11). These tactics span the oppositional sector, from those advocating for gender equality or labour rights to environmental protection.
An example of how these approaches can coalesce successfully can be found in the Loç Valley Protection Platform, formed in 2009 to oppose a hydroelectric project on the Devrekani River in Kastamonu. Locals resisted the construction work through sit-ins and night vigils. The campaign mobilised many first-time activists and created a broad local coalition (the involvement of women and elders countered claims that protesters were outsiders). The platform gained national attention during the 2013 Gezi Park protests and networked with other environmental movements while remaining officially nonpartisan. After years of legal struggle, in which courts halted work multiple times, the company abandoned the project in 2016 (Yabanci 2025, 170–71).
It is important, however, not to overstate successes. Gains often come on individual issues and can be temporary, overturned on appeal, or invalidated quietly when attention shifts elsewhere. For instance, while Loç Valley’s protests succeeded, dozens of hydroelectric plants have been built across Turkey, despite frequent local opposition (Akbulut et al. 2018). Incessent repression, burnout, and a significant brain drain abroad make sustained contestation difficult.
Those abroad count, too
An important but often overlooked element of Turkey’s civil society is its diaspora, which includes millions with ties to the country. Sinem Adar highlighted that the space of ‘abroad’ has long shaped civil society, offering refuge to political exiles from left and right and serving as a source of fundraising. The AKP has actively courted this constituency. In 2010 it created the Presidency of Expatriate Turks and Related Communities (YTB) (Öktem 2014) and in 2012 expatriates gained the right to vote (Yener-Roderburg 2024). In the 2023 presidential election, over 1.8 million citizens abroad cast ballots, generally favouring the AKP (Adar et al. 2024, 2). While not decisive so far, diaspora votes could matter in a close race. This outreach aligns with the AKP’s paternalistic vision of Turkey as a spokesperson for Muslims globally, especially those facing Islamophobia in the West (Koru 2025; Öktem 2014, 16–20), while opposition groups make use of Europe’s wider freedom of expression to organize and critique in ways impossible within Turkey.
Discussion of those living outside Turkey naturally led to another question: how can they help strengthen Turkish civil society? Panellists offered different takes. Emrah Gürsel believed that outside donors need to commit more forcefully to democratic civil society organisations in Turkey. Financial commitment is particularly needed. Many sources of international funding have been pulled, in part due to a sustained AKP campaign of prosecuting receipients under what Amnesty International has labelled the ‘unacceptably broad’ terror laws (Amnesty International 2021, 10). Consequently, many groups in Turkey are living hand-to-mouth. Outside actors who want to help should, in Gürsel’s words, ‘trust’ the organisations. Audits and due diligence are of course necessary, but once they choose to support a Turkish partner, they should back the organisations for a significant portion of time — ideally years. Bilge Yabancı struck a more sombre tone. In her eyes, opposition Turkish civil society is to all intents and purposes fending for itself.
Turkey: an ongoing cautionary tale?
The year 2025 feels like a significant point in the trajectory of Turkish civil society. The main opposition party, the CHP, has come under a multi-pronged assault. On 19 March, Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested and imprisoned on spurious corruption charges, weeks before he was expected to be confirmed as the CHP’s presidential candidate for the 2028 elections against Erdoğan. The arrest sparked large street protests, heavily suppressed with 1,900 detentions (Derhgawen 2025). In September, a court invalidated the 2023 congress of the CHP’s Istanbul branch, dismissing its chairperson and hundreds of delegates and replacing them with a court-appointed interim, prompting further demonstrations (Soylu 2025). In October, a parallel case seeking to remove CHP leader Özgür Özel for alleged irregularities in his own election collapsed when the court threw it out. Yet the broader tactic of using the legal system to disable the opposition shows no sign of ending: on the same day, Istanbul prosecutors filed new espionage charges against İmamoğlu (Rathbone et al. 2025).
Rümeysa Çamdereli, Research Director of the YADA foundation, responded to the latest crackdown by warning: “If civil society doesn’t speak now, we risk having nothing left to defend in just a couple of years” (Civicus Lens 2025). Opposition civil society is certainly trying to resist. Groups released statements condemning the crackdown on the CHP. Boycotts of businesses seen as close to the AKP were arranged. The CHP continues to hold rallies and protests, including its first overseas demonstration in Brussels, mobilising critics in the diaspora and also trying to raise the issue on the agenda of European governments (BBC 2025). Limited survey data points to a majority of the Turkish population viewing the trials as politically-motivated (Turkish Minute 2025). The CHP has been energised, as have many in the broader opposition. Yet whether this momentum can achieve tangible progress in rolling back the attack on democracy is highly unclear.
The speakers at the event offered similarly mixed conclusions. Whilst acknowledging there is still a fight to be had in Turkey, they emphasised how the slide into authoritarianism should serve as a cautionary tale. Around the world, individuals and civil society organisations should not bide their time or be selective in their battles. Rather, they should speak up at the earliest sign of democratic erosion, while opposition is novel and checks and balances still exist. Do not wait, all agreed, until the stakes are as high as they are in Turkey today.
Dr John McManus is an EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow with the Maecenata Foundation after spending 7 years in Turkey.
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[1] https://www.maecenata.eu/en/backsliding-democracy/
[2] Many such guardians are known as ‘Kemalists’ after Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey and country’s first president (Finkel 2012, 30–33).
