UDO STEINBACH
RUPERT GRAF STRACHWITZ
PIERO ANTONIO RUMIGNANI
(EDS.)

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

TALKING, LEARNING, WORKING, AND LIVING TOGETHER

2

The Authors

Robert Attalah UNHCR – Syria Operation, Cairo, Egypt
Prof. Dr. Yamina Bettahar Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France
Filiz Bikmen Social Investment and Philanthropy Adviser, Istanbul, Turkey
Prof. Dr. Henry Frendo University of Malta, Valletta, Malta
Prof. Dr. Sahar Hamouda Alexandria and Mediterranean Research Center / Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Alexandria, Egypt
Piero Antonio Rumignani Maecenata Foundation, Berlin, Germany
Dr. Orhan Silier History Foundation of Turkey, Istanbul, Turkey
Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz Maecenata Foundation, Berlin, Germany
Prof. Dr. Bernd Thum Karlsruhe Institute of Technology / Foundation Euro-Mediterranean Knowledge Space, Karlsruhe, Germany

Disclaimer: Despite careful control the publisher accepts no liability for any content and external links. The authors are solely responsible for the content of linked pages as well as for textual copyright issues.

EUROPA BOTTOM-UP
NR. 12/2015

UDO STEINBACH, RUPERT GRAF STRACHWITZ, PIERO ANTONIO RUMIGNANI (EDS.)

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
TALKING, LEARNING, WORKING, AND LIVING TOGETHER
2

A Conference at Villa Vigoni, Loveno di Menaggio, Italy
20th to 22nd April, 2015

Contents

N.B.

After the conference held at Villa Vigoni in April of 2015, it was decided to publish 2 volumes of documents: Volume 1[1] contains the minutes of the sessions of the conference. In this 2nd volume, we present some additional material assembled before and after the conference, including a report on the preparatory workshop held at Villa Vigoni in 2013. In order to provide readers of this volume, who are not in possession of Volume 1, with the necessary background, the foreword to Volume 1 is included almost verbatim here.

Foreword

The Romans called the Mediterranean *Mare Nostrum* (*Our Sea*). But even before, and particularly after the end of the Roman Empire, a succession of powers originating from all sides, has been struggling over centuries to answer the question whose sea it really ought to be. Throughout the 19th century and until the end of World War II, various European powers claimed predominance.

In the early 1970s, the Mediterranean reentered the European scene, when the European Community (EC) decided to establish a common foreign policy for the then six member states. In the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, the special relationship with the countries of Northern Africa had already been recognized; in the 1960s association agreements had been concluded with Greece and Turkey. Treaties regarding trade relations with single Mediterranean countries followed up until 1971. In November of 1972, however, the Council decided to change the approach and base the relationship on principles of a Global Mediterranean Policy. Equal conditions would be offered to any Mediterranean country (and Jordan), in case they wished to embark on a closer economic relationship. At the same time, due to pressure from various Arab governments, efforts were made by Europeans to contribute to solving political conflicts in the Mediterranean, first and foremost the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Venice Declaration (1980) were the results of these efforts and they were to play a significant political role in Europe's neighbourhood.

After the end of the East-West conflict, the role of the enlarged European Union (EU) in its immediate neighbourhood became the subject of intense debates. There were voices advocating two separate areas of responsibility: an alliance between Central and East-Central, East, and South-East Europe based on the partners' geographical proximity and historical relationship; and an alliance

---

[1] Udo Steinbach, Rupert Graf Strachwitz, Piero Antonio Rumignani (Eds.): Europe and the Mediterranean – Talking, Learning, Working, and Living together 1, EBU No. 11, Berlin: Maecenata Stiftung 2015, http://www.maecenata.eu/images/2015_EBU_11.pdf.

between the EU's Mediterranean members and the countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Eventually, the answer to this was the Barcelona Process, initiated in 1995; the EU at large would be in charge of shaping the relationship with both their eastern and southern neighbours.

Ten years on, an assessment concluded that the Barcelona Process had not been a success story. The reasons were manifold: a lack of readiness for fair economic cooperation, serious political divergencies, conflicting interests, and deep rooted mistrust regarding the other side's commitment to come to arrangements on an equal footing. The (most commonly French) idea of replacing or supplementing the Barcelona Process by an initiative for a Mediterranean Union however, met with doubt and resistance on both sides from the beginning, and became obsolete when the Arab Spring broke out at the end of 2010.

Relations between the Northern and Southern shore have since become still more complex and difficult. The rise of the tide of people desperately trying to reach the Northern shores as refugees, as asylum seekers or simply looking for a better life, has added another dimension. Even before that, the financial crisis had undermined the EU's enthusiasm to interact with its neighbours, internal challenges being given priority. When the dramatic changes in the Arab neighbourhood did take place, the EU was left without any stringent concept to react to them. While a parcel of measures was implemented to support single groups and emerging forces who seemed able to lead their countries towards a new political order, the fundamental dilemma became apparent, when the revolt ended in political stalemate, new repression and brutal local conflicts. Given the perspective of an ongoing and long-lasting political crisis with some of the non-European participants in the former Barcelona process and with no end in sight to the financial crisis in Europe (which may well politically destabilize single EU members), the prospect of resuming an engaged and meaningful dialogue and cooperation with the Mediterranean neighbourhood at government level is dim.

All this is hardly a matter of debate. There is, however, another side of the coin. Struggling for a new political order which will permit people to live in dignity, the Southern shore challenges the Northern shore of the Mediterranean to enter into a comprehensive alliance to shape conditions for a common future and living together in peace. With governments constrained by many other reasonings, civil society emerges ever more strongly as the arena in which such an alliance may be shaped, developed and tested. For *Our Sea* to become the paradigm of an including vision and of the awareness that in the 21st century the quality of mutual relationships will determine the place of Europe and its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern neighbourhood in the global order, citizen action beyond the mechanisms of government intervention is of essence.

Our initiative to remain in touch and develop closer relations with societal forces in Europe's Mediterranean neighbourhood has to be seen against this backdrop. We are aware of the tremendous storm which resulted in initial changes. We have also seen the countless young people who want change – albeit in different ways, with different agendas and different scopes of political institutions; and we are convinced that in spite of the setbacks they are still there and the dynamics unleashed have not fundamentally run out of steam. We have heard their claims that democratic constitutions and the rule of law should be established. In short, we have heard their call for dignity to be respected for each and every human being in society.

In the absence of governmental institutions by which to reorganize dialogue and cooperation it is for us to take the initiative and keep alive the vision of a common future, based on multifold political, economic and cultural ties throughout a long common history.

Hence the somewhat vague title of the project, initiated by the Maecenata Foundation in 2012:

Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together – Europe and the Mediterranean

A first workshop was organized in cooperation with the German-Italian Centre of European Excellence at Villa Vigoni on Lake Como in 2013[2]. It was agreed to hold a second, larger conference to explore the matter in more detail, and to invite participants from as many different countries and as many walks of life as possible in order to discover starting points for a shift of outlook. Not what divides us but what we have in common it was felt should be the basis of our interaction.

Against this backdrop, the conference organized by the Maecenata Foundation and the Governance Center Middle East | North Africa of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform in April of 2015, focussed on the issues determining the historical and cultural traditions and facts which constitute the perception of commonness; delegates from Kosovo, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Malta, Spain, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Austria and Germany were invited to discuss to what extent these are valid and instrumental to substantiate the vision of the future politically, culturally and economically. How can we find each other anew? How can we dissolve the contradiction of, on one hand, feeling close to each other in terms of political values and, on the other hand, being so distant in political reality? What are the new conditions under which we may build our common – Mediterranean – house? How may

---

[2] See the report in this volume.

citizens be and remain involved in shaping the common future? These were some of the questions we wished to tackle.

Experts were invited to present and discuss their arguments both in plenary sessions and informally in the beautiful setting of Villa Vigoni. The format of the conference aimed at providing as much time as possible for discussion. The group which eventually assembled at the Villa Vigoni was a balanced mix from every point of view: male and female, older and younger, academicians and practitioners.

In particular, the following subjects were brought up in the course of 48 hours:

- Our common cultural history;
- Migration: Advocating transnational and transcultural citizenship;
- New political models: Can the nation state be overcome?;
- Economic models: The viability of differing financial systems;
- Civil society as a catalyst of commonness;
- The role of the media.

Given the prevailing political conditions and circumstances, the organizers feel much encouraged by the response they received. The conference became a manifestation of the Mediterranean universe.

The organizers wish to thank all participants for attending the conference and for contributing to its success through their invaluable input and contributions as well as their readiness to engage in this somewhat unusual format. Special thanks are due to Professor Immacolata Amodeo, Secretary General of the German-Italian Centre of Excellence of Villa Vigoni, and her wonderful team for her cooperation in hosting this event. Finally, on behalf of the organizing institutions and of all participants, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to the Mercator Foundation, the Allianz Cultural Foundation, and to a private donor, without whose financial and intellectual support holding this conference would not have been possible.

Berlin, July 2015

Udo Steinbach   Piero Antonio Rumignani   Rupert Graf Strachwitz

Civic Contributions to the Trans-Mediterranean Dialogue

Report on the preparatory workshop held at Villa Vigoni in 2013[3]

By Piero Antonio Rumignani

After a welcome by *Prof. Dr. Immacolata Amodeo*, who recalled how the idea of the conference was born (with the aim of preparing a larger conference in 2014 as well as other initiatives) each of the participants introduced him/herself and the own motivation for participating to the meeting.

Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz then made a short introductory presentation, reminding the group of the strong historical and cultural bridges across the Mediterranean and stressing the role of civic action for a better mutual relationship and understanding. He particularly emphasized the value of civil society belonging to a historically strongly interrelated area in creating an atmosphere of respect and human bonds destined to bypass national divides. Leveraging on past achievements – including in particular peace, enhanced prosperity, social change within cultural diversity – Europe is called to translate its proclaimed principles of modern society (democracy, rule of law, human and civil rights, cultural traditions) into a vision addressing its present challenges of which the "South" issue is one of the main elements. Overcoming past attitudes and perceptions, Europe should here shift its attention from the emphasis on differences among different peoples towards the identification of their commonalities and the sharing of chances. To this end Europe is required to act as a geographical and social entity representing the new natural habitat of its people vs. traditional national states which are beset by growing limitations in an increasingly globalised world.

The ensuing discussion developed along these lines following a four point agenda: Europe, The Mediterranean, Approaches / Potential for Civic Action.

Europe

Any realistic approach from the European side to the existing issues has to be based on its nucleus of shared values based on the principles of equal rights, solidarity, minority protection, freedom of moving. For its further development it has to be ensured that the above values are shared and applied by the actors in civil society.

---

[3] This report was previously published in: Rupert Graf Strachwitz: Für ein Europa der Bürgerinnen und Bürger – Ein Projekt der Maecenata Stiftung, EBU No. 2, Berlin: Maecenata Stiftung 2013, http://www.maecenata.eu/images/documents/mst/EBU/2013_EBU_02.pdf.

It was however pointed out by some participants that while Europe should definitely not be seen as a purely economic expression, solutions are to be supported by a true political and economical vision as framework for the development of a civil society in order to give real expression to the shared values.

The present trends under the effects of the ongoing economic crisis are detrimental to a political discourse driven by values. Expenditure is wound back, especially in socially sensitive areas and education (an example among others: Bologna project). Seen from the south Mediterranean countries Europe appears to close on itself disregarding expectations ("Europa schottet sich ab"). This has a negative impact when in Arab countries the set-up of alternatives to intolerant ideologies in the social area is bitterly needed.

Such developments contribute to a further contamination of the values as they are commonly understood (a particular example: the idea of secularity). Prudence is recommended when the idea of Europe is squeezed in a discrepancy between a proclaimed "wonderful reality" on one side and its identity crisis on the other while the idea itself of Europe among the public becomes less and less popular.

While time is needed to sort out existing problems avoiding at the same time that things fall apart, we have possibly to "use the crisis" finding in the original values/virtues ("Tugenden") the way and means to overcome it. This is key in the approach to the non-European Mediterranean countries.

The Mediterranean

While the undergoing deep political and social changes in the non-European Mediterranean area require an increased attention – making obsolete the old European top-down political approach which privileged undemocratic oligarchies –, the European Union appears to give less priority to the area, possibly as consequence of its enlargement in areas far from the Mediterranean area. Initiatives of the Southern countries (i.a. the 5+5 dialogue) have so far had little impact.

Attention was drawn to the need for a proper reading of the events (e.g. of the Arab spring as a broad expression of strongly diversified upheavals against corrupted systems under the control of minorities) by the Europeans as a requirement for a realistic approach to the issues on the table. In this context complexity is produced by the strong differences existing among the non-European Mediterranean countries. An obvious distinction divides those countries where armed insurrections have taken or are taking place from those which try to adjust gradually to the new situation.

The migration issue was seen as a particular stumbling block; it was recognized that Italy is severely touched by its consequences.

Increasing islamophobe attitudes in Europe blur the situation and render a rational and constructive approach to the open issues politically more difficult.

Demographic and economic numbers however will represent a strong catalyst for a rethinking and a refocusing of the European attention towards the Mediterranean area.

The European attitude is matched by a split reaction in Arab countries where the resurgence of a radical Islamism is also a reminder of the fact that it is to a good extent also the product of past European actions in distant and less distant times. For this very reason any vision about the future relationship between Europe and the non-European Mediterranean countries has to take very carefully into account historical legacies.

There was a consensus that Europe needs to apprehend the developments in the whole of the Mediterranean area. While Syria at this moment in history rightly attracts particular attention, developments in countries on the southern shore (e.g. Tunisia) should not be overlooked, and special attention should also be devoted to Turkey. The personal view of all participants was that Turkish efforts to join the European Union should be encouraged.

Approaches / Potential for Civic Action

The main potential for civil society and civic action is in bridging and actively promoting commonalities and alliances between citizens.

A bridge has to be created in a situation which a participant defined according to the latest developments in Egypt as the discrepancy between a world where "there is critical thinking but no vision" and another world where "there is vision but no action". This "bridge" means to create an actionable link between the typical value based European approach (the good side of Europe) and the very tangible local and inter-relational problems of the south Mediterranean in the framework of a transformational partnership ("Transformationspartnerschaft" according to the definition of a participant) where the establishment of a culture of recognition ("Kultur der Anerkennung") is actively pursued.

The above means in particular constructively addressing key issues discussed with intensity during the meeting and related to: migration, education, transfer of human resources and know-how, investments, corruption, religious tolerance, minority and women rights.

In this perspective there should be place for a broader involvement and engagement of civil society where room is given to the development of civic action.

Outcome

The group defined three areas for further action:

1. The migration issue: Here, the promotion of information and rethinking traditional positions is called for. It was felt that this could be achieved by helping existing civil society organizations (e.g. Mediendienst Migration) in their efforts by supplying them with material, contacts etc.
2. The issue of Europe and the Mediterranean as a common cultural sphere: Following the analysis that the cultural commonalities are not universally realized and appreciated, and that a process of self-criticism, respect and mutual learning needs to be initiated, the idea of a publication was launched. Further details t.b.d.
3. The issue of civil society as a driving element for future development: The group adopted the suggestion that this issue merits a broader discussion in a conference to be held in 2014. The conference should concentrate on an evaluation of civil society experiences in the Mediterranean.

Further Steps

The participants are encouraged to provide own comments and proposals how the process can be continued including further action flanking/leading to the above mentioned conference planned for 2014.

Particular attention should be devoted to the future use/involvement of the media and other communication instruments (parallel: event organized by Ethnobarometer in May 2012 – a participant will try to procure and circulate the proceedings).

The Maecenata Foundation and Villa Vigoni will give feed-back on the process to the participants suggesting following steps (to this end and in order to facilitate communication a list of the participants including their coordinates will be circulated shortly).

Euromed Unifiers and Dividers: What Prospects?

By Henry Frendo

I. Euromed Unifiers and Dividers: What Prospects?

It is the height of irony that the co-existence of differences should appear so tenuous in our own 'modern' or 'post-modern' times, when it would have seemed that three nightmares haunting the second half of the 20th century had been exorcised.

The first of these was a total war, starting in central Europe, circling the earth, leading to unprecedented destruction and devastation by sophisticated weaponry, an organized genocide, and the dropping of atomic bombs. In 1945 the catch phrase was 'never again – plus jamais'. In the words of one Swiss historian, Denis de Rougemont, mentor of the European Cultural Foundation, future generations needed an *habeas corpus* as much as an *habeas animam*.

The second was a protracted, often bloody South-North struggle against European territorial and economic expansion, imperialism and colonialism, especially in Africa and Asia, but also very much on the borders of the European mainland itself, or indeed within them, not least in the Mediterranean region comprising the Near and Middle East. After the Suez débâcle of 1956, disengagement and decolonization saw most countries celebrating their freedom, or rather their independence, from foreign occupation.

The third, in and after 1989, was the dismantling of what had become a post-war norm, the East-West military-ideological divide across the European continent, and well beyond it, from Cuba to Ethiopia to Vietnam. The Berlin Wall fell, bringing to an end the polarization between 'American' capitalism on one hand, and 'Soviet' communism, on the other, with each bloc's orbit of satellites. That's partly what Francis Fukuyama meant by 'The End of History', a rather optimistic futuristic scenario, wherein liberal capitalism in a democracy-driven statehood would have won the day compulsively and indefinitely.

By contrast, what Samuel Huntington foresaw was an impending clash of civilizations and what he called 'tribal conflict on a global scale'. To him, the secular optimism of those who believed that mankind was being drawn into peaceful co-existence and mutually beneficial co-operation by the growth of global markets was 'suicidal', given the rise of China and of Islam as 'the challenger civilizations'.

In the light of various contemporary goings-on, some more grisly than others as in beheadings, hangings, amputations, crucifixions, massacres, expulsions,

abductions, most spectacularly in parts of the so-called Arab world, these sadly are sobering reflections. They put into a different focus much of the well-meaning idealism seen in the 1990s, the plans and structures initiated hopefully to fuel peace, dialogue and prosperity.

The end of the Cold War, as understood after 1989, and the subsequent emergence of several former Soviet 'republics' as independent states with 'Western' democratic aspirations, understandably shifted the European Union's attention from the South to the East. Thus by 1992 European direct foreign investment to the Central and Eastern European countries was more than twice that allocated to the Mediterranean non-member states. Although some 24% the Community's energy imports were from Mediterranean countries in the early 1990s, the latter suffered a trade deficit of ECU 6 billion.

Partly under the prodding of Spain and of the European Parliament, to remedy this unbalance and steer a European-Mediterranean way forward, a resolution in May 1994 called for the setting up of a 'Mediterranean Assembly' (a version of which much later would be headquartered in St Julian's). Much more importantly, in October 1994, the Commission asked the EU to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This progressively could create a Euromed economic zone with its North African and Middle East neighbours, thereby establishing 'the biggest free trade area in the world' (covering up to 800,000,000 people in thirty or more countries). In the European Council meeting in Germany in December, the Commission reiterated its willingness to support the Mediterranean countries in their efforts progressively to transform their region into 'a zone of peace, stability, prosperity and co-operation'. To this end, it would reach agreements, strengthen trade relations, and maintain an appropriate balance in the geographical allocation of EU expenditure and commitments.'

In the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference, the Barcelona Declaration, to which Malta was a signatory, endorsed this 'Partnership'. This new multilateral framework had the objective of 'turning the Mediterranean basin into 'an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity', which required 'a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures'. The Partnership's three pillars would be political and security, economic and financial; and social, cultural and human. It was in the attempt to implement this last and vital factor that an inter-cultural Foundation was set up, based in Egypt, named after a Swede, and assigned to the management of a German, while he lasted.

The Barcelona process was a noble prospect, rendered all the more necessary in the face of arms proliferation, terrorism, fundamentalist Islam, mass illegal immigration, drug trafficking and, generally, globalization including multinational corporations which would benefit from looser national or border controls.

Some progress was made in this direction, but not much. There were Euro-Med driven high level meetings and conferences under different EU presidencies. EU non-military aid increased, conciliatory mediation efforts were made in, for example, the festering Palestine-Israel question; and scores of exchanges took place. By 2004 the number of the EU's member states went up from 15 to 28, including Bulgaria and Roumania. Of these two were island European Mediterranean states, Malta and Cyprus (excluding Northern Cyprus where Turkey had intervened in 1974 in response to an attempted Greek coup d'état; this latter state was not internationally recognized; although Turkey itself aspired to join the EU as well at some point in the future).

The Barcelona Process kick-started various other initiatives, such as the Euromed Dialogue in the Mediterranean Civil Forum, held in Malta in April 1997; and the Mediterranean University Forum, the third edition of which was held in Malta in June 2006. One of the speakers in this forum, Enric Olive' or Tarragona, and I, worked closely to try and get going a European-Mediterranean University Forum, because we strongly believed that universities had, and indeed have, an important role to play in any dialogic regional encounters, from Brussels to Rabat to Beirut, although circumstances do not always facilitate such a desired ongoing dynamic. On its part the Council of Europe organized various encounters, also in the field of local and regional governance, such as the conferences of Mediterranean and Black Sea Basins, the fifth of which we held in Marmaris, Turkey, in February 1999; its Congress of Local and Regional Authorities had its North-South and Euromed Group; a conference held exceptionally in Morocco was fully subscribed and there was much interest in devolution and in links with European institutions. In other words, beneath the surface of all the sensationalist and frequently very disturbing goings-on, ordinary people on all shores of our Sea do yearn for normalcy, dialogue and harmony, as well as for improved standards of living and lifestyles. The challenge lies in overcoming the dissonance, and in violent, extremist, often internecine sectarian or power-driven diversions, which interrupt or prevent networking in essentially positive directions.

Unfortunately relations have largely soured or shifted, mainly as a consequence of instability, which ironically was partly caused by mass attempts at regeneration. The murderous attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11th September 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks, as in Madrid on 11th March 2004, and more recently elsewhere caused much anguish, suspicion and a

deterioration of security and mutual trust generally. As often happens, reactions to the work of extremists, who are in a minority, extends to whole countries and populations. There were also financial ups and downs, even in the Eurozone, bail-outs and a slow recovery. Trafficked mass illegal immigration to the northern Mediterranean shores, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa via Libya and elsewhere, caused strains and has had social and political fall-outs, which continue.

What seemed like an Arab Spring a few years ago, and offered a more open society and hope, has generally transmogrified into chaos or still harsher or indeed more sectarian regimes than before. The Bath parties in Syria and Iraq were dictatorial but they were essentially secularist and stable. The Bath's main founder in 1947, Michel Aflaq, was a Christian. The voice of the people made itself amply heard during the Arab Spring and promised to have opened up monolithic fear-driven and authoritarian regimes. Not altogether unsuccessfully, particularly perhaps in Tunisia and Morocco, while Lebanon typically struggles not to get involved in regional proxy wars. However, right now, post-Gaddafi Libya risks becoming a failed state, not unlike Somalia, which has been picking up the pieces or indeed northern Nigeria. Iraq, which the U.S.A. invaded to oust Saddam Hussein allegedly because he harboured weapons of mass destruction, which he did not, has been grossly destabilized, and is in the throes of another occupation, this time by the so-called Islamic State or Caliphate, a more brutal version of Al Qaeda. Americans and Europeans have sometimes been implored to intervene, at other times not. At least in terms of political rhetoric, such foreign involvement has been fuelled by the defence of minorities against genocide, and/or the upholding of human rights, but that is too simplistic a rendering as various other interests could be at stake. Current Russian involvement in the Ukraine, in what is essentially a war scenario, coupled with EU and NATO reactions, even question the belief that the Cold War ended in 1989.

All told, hardly any of the mission statements endorsed at Barcelona may be said to have been fulfilled in practice, so far at any rate. In Palestine we have just seen a disproportionate use of superior force by Israel to quell belligerent instigations; while continuing deeds of arbitrariness predicated on the might is right principle, hardly augur well. Efforts at mediation, by Egypt for example, remain vital, but not as temporary touch-and-go solutions. The good vibes resulting from the Oslo peace talks came to an end with the assassination of Yitzak Rabin. As in the case of Gandhi who was assassinated by a Hindu, so too in the case of Rabin, he was assassinated by a Jew. Further blatant Zionist encroachments on what's left of Palestinian land cannot permit meaningful talks with Israel; such humiliations only lead to a culture of despair. As if that were not enough, we are seeing intra-ethnic and intra-religious confrontations of the worst kind. Sunnis against Alawites, Shiites against Sunnis, extremists

against moderates, and so on. One Kurdish prelate has described the persecution of Christians and Yazidis in northern Iraq, or is it Kurdistan, as worse than anything done by Genghis Khan, known for his slash and burn tactics. Copts have been repeatedly targeted in Egypt, especially after the overthrow of Mubarak. The army have now clamped down remorselessly on what has long been feared as a state within a state, the Muslim Brotherhood, including with it any dissenting even liberal or secular voices. Exegesis has been in short supply; one thinks even of a critically-minded sage such as Jamal ad-din Al Afghani, who ended up in exile and lies buried in an unknown grave.

One Iraqi historian who spoke in favour of consultation and dialogue was shot the following day. In her brilliant autobiography Benazir Bhulto castigates Islamist fundamentalist as un-Islamic and non-Koronic; she was assassinated after her reception.

In other words, with some exceptions, right now one would be forgiven for feeling that much of the intended Euromed dialogue and dialectic apparently has gone to abide on another planet. In spite of some new discourse and a slowly changing mood, Israel continues to be roundly backed by the U.S.A. The latter state even stopped its contribution to UNESCO once Palestine was recognized as a member of that organization, crippling its budget. UNESCO's message that if war starts in the minds of men it is in the minds of men that it must be countered, remains vibrant. The question is what if anything lies in the minds of many men, other perhaps than bloodthirsty stereotyped power-mania, pseudo gender domination, or exploitation of resources, or a historicist-inspired revenge; and who today, in this virtual age of globalized social media, is moulding and influencing what is felt and or thought? There would seem to be a profound cynical disenchantment mixed with a groping for absolutes and certitudes at any price, at the same time that uncertainties prevail and multiply.

In a study inspired by Albin Michel's *Ou sont le valeurs*, published by UNESCO in 2004, it was clearly held that not all actions were permissible or all crimes justified in the name of cultural diversity. In other words, values mattered; but certain bloodthirsty sectarian or denominational behavior makes one wonder where these values rest, or indeed what they are. One is tempted to exclaim with that 19th century painter of storms, Turner, troubled as he was by slavery horrors such as the throwing of human cargo overboard: 'Hope, hope, fallacious hope, where is they market now?'

But clearly, most ordinary people want to hope, and are exasperated at this turn of events in their own countries. Burning oil wells and burst water dams are not going to solve any problems; much less are beheadings and crucifixions, or arguably uncalled for and ill-advised military invasions across the seas to change regimes, for that matter. Why do hundreds of thousands of people turn

out to see the Pope in Korea? As it has been well said, all that is needed for evil to triumph is for the good men to do nothing. Still, the fear dynamic endures, and it is increasingly backed by the hardware of military technology and propagandistic obsessions.

As Europe remains an anchor of relative stability and prosperity, it can contribute to a much-desired improvement in relations with the Mediterranean world. But solutions cannot be imposed from above. They have to germinate from below. What is largely at issue is governance. Wealth has to be shared; it does not belong to the state. A state may be wealthy, but if its wealth is not distributed the people remain in the lurch. In addition, there are visceral groundswells of tribalism, sectarianism and messianism. Stability, security and serenity are increasingly at a premium, giving us cause to ponder on past definitions and formulae for European-Mediterranean relations.

II. Some Post-Braudelian Reflections

In 1949 a leading French scholar, Fernand Braudel published an influential two volume Mediterranean regional history *La Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen à l'Epoque de Philippe II*. In this work, of which other editions later came out, also in English translation, Braudel set out to portray a holistic understanding of the whole Mediterranean region, stressing its integral socio-historical unity. The Mediterranean, as an inland sea on which various shores bordered, and other physical features, such as the three peninsulas of Iberia, Italy and Greece, climate, vegetation, trade and other inter-actions, were underlined through much painstaking research. Here was, he wanted to show, a comprehensive history of an entire region, which had a distinct life-force of its own.

In the spirit of France's *Annales* school (Started by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre), with which he was closely-associated, Braudel focused on the *longue duree,* the slow-moving and only very slowly changing *mentalites,* characterizing human history, of which the age-old Mediterranean was an epitome. His work was set within a particular time-frame, when Spain was still at its apex, in Europe and in the Mediterranean during the 16th century – Philip II died in 1598 – although on its Atlantic side the Age of Discovery had well and truly started as well. Braudel's was an unconventional and innovative way of writing history, looking at aspects which transcended the realm of the political, more fickle and changeable than the physical and human geography.

Profoundly influencing historiography through his concept, method and approach, Braudel saw the Mediterranean as a unitary physical and human unit in space and time, in a seemingly unending *continuum*. In the preface to the English edition of *La Mediterranee* as recently as 1972, Braudel held that two of his major truths had remained unchanged. The first was the unity and

coherence of the Mediterranean region: "I retain the firm conviction that the Turkish Mediterranean lived and breathed with the same rhythms as the Christian, that the whole sea shared a common destiny." The second was "the greatness of the Mediterranean, which lasted well after the age of Columbus and Vasco da Gama."

In recent years, other scholars have been less visionary and optimistic about the Mediterranean reality as sweepingly presented by Braudel, although there is no doubt that it embodies many truths and retains many merits. It inspired or was complemented by scholars from related disciplines, such as Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers in sociology and social anthropology, who have identified characteristics allegedly peculiar to the Mediterranean peoples, foremost among these being the prevalence of honour and shame in their psyche, determining aspects of their communal life. By such supposedly exclusive and unique attributes, critics such as Herzfeld and Pina-Cabral have argued, Mediterraneanists wanted to make the region seem backward and exotic. While the European nation-state was modern and progressive, Mediterranean village life was backward and primitive. Such 'otherness' would facilitate the superior domination of the South by the North.

To what extent did such a Braudelian oneness exist throughout the Mediterranean, even in the 16th century; indeed, would it not have existed still earlier; and how far, if at all, might it be said to persist in time today?

In a major work by two British scholars published in 2000, *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History,* Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have sought to somewhat redimension the Braudelian thesis, although they are supportive of many of its components. First of all they ante-date it, taking us back to the philosopher Socrates, the geographer Strabo, and other thinkers from antiquity to the Middle Ages. Looking at comparatively unknown localities, they also differentiate between a history in the Mediterranean – what happens there from time to time – and a history of it, the latter being obviously the more ambitious, penetrating and wide-ranging approach. Most interestingly of all, they argue that one can hardly apply any Braudelian-like assumptions and conclusions to the contemporary Mediterranean. During the twentieth century, write Horden and Purcell, the Mediterranean region has to a considerable extent been "disintegrated". Excepting a growing coneSnsus with regard to protecting the environment, "the network of its microecologies" has been radically reconfigured "by the involvement of its coastal nations in the credit economies, political alliances, technologies and communications networks of the North and West or the Far East" in other words, although one corsair was as good as another, and the olive belt may still be located on a map encompassing Southern Europe, Northern Africa and the Near East, through such modernization, or globalization, there has been an opening up which

would render less intact and less peculiar that which in the past may have seemed to be the gel of similarity and of unity. The argument becomes more complex and theoretical, almost futuristic, venturing beyond the historical discipline itself.

In a modernist stock-taking of the contemporary Mediterranean, where nation-states have replaced colonies, and advanced technologies penetrate resilient traditional societies, it is difference rather than similarity that would seem to be the more striking. Navigation is no longer a concern as transport and travel, for example, have moved from sea to land to air, while communication, that all-important sinew of mutual contact in a defined space, has entered a world of virtual realities. One could probably speak with greater authority of the Mississippi as a region than of the Mediterranean Sea with the countries and peoples bordering it.

Nor is the environment just ecological. It is cultural, religious, economic, political, organizational. In all these aspects of it, there have been remarkable divergencies to North and South, the European and the Arab or African, the Western and the Oriental. While making all due allowance for stereotyping and generalization, the facts indicate that North Africa and the so-called Arab world may not be coming closer to Europe or to America, Muslim to Christian, or indeed to Jew; except perhaps, and arguably, in the sphere of often illegal Arab-African migration and settlement.

Many a minaret in recent decades has pierced a European and American skyline, in addition to the customary baroque domes or Gothic steeples; even an occasional pagoda perhaps. In various genres of art, the European normally remained identifiable from the Arab or African, although continental and area influence and over-lap have long preyed and sometimes inspired each other. Folk dance and song such as Flamenco in southern Spain or *Għana* in Malta may certainly owe their origins to the Moors or Arabs in earlier times, although the orchestra, the concert, the opera, remain European inventions. Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and indeed Arab influences made and left their mark throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Mediterranean islands, and northern Africa at least up to Morocco as well as in Spain, Sicily, and all the way to the gates of Vienna, if not beyond them. A coffee might be Turkish to an Egyptian, or Greek to a Sicilian, but essentially it is much the same thing, symptomatic of an intimately related heritage.

Less romantically, if one looks today at the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, for example, there is hardly a grain of closer integration with a European mainstream lifestyle. The latter is now secularist to the point that the drafters of a Constitution or the European Union meeting in Brussels led by Giscard d'Estaing decided not to as much as include a reference to God, let alone

Christianity, in it. While the Huntington thesis may sound like conspiracy theory, the sabre-rattling and crusader-like drawing of battle lines dominating the world media, and particularly the American media, is frighteningly all too reminiscent of old believer-infidel antagonisms. Nobody will stop to think if Saladin, a Kurd, was more ethical in his treatment of prisoners of war than Richard I, nicknamed the Lion Heart – as Professor Jonathan Riley-Smith of Cambridge University has reminded us.

Differences here are not simply doctrinal but more insidiously structural and institutional. Thus, you have a sharp contrast between a strict, militant theocracy as represented by the *Sharia* law, on one hand, and a passive secularist, hedonist consumerism, on the other hand, which assumes a separation between church and state, civil rights, and legal obligations arising from individual status and citizenry. These differences are fed by inequality of lifestyle and of opportunity.

The analogy of Socrates about the Mediterranean, intended mainly for the ancient Greeks, that "we inhabit a small portion of the earth, living round the sea like ants and frogs round a pool", is of little consolation when latter-day frogs can jump over rivers, mountain ranges, and across continents, blowing themselves up, and you with them, in the process, if they choose to.

Different religions, legal systems, and blind abuse of weapons technology, necessarily give rise to concerns about security and self-protection of the one from the other. The divide thus grows wider not narrower. The sea sadly becomes more of a divider than a unifier. If Europe has not frequently been unified, except perhaps under Charlemagne or Charles V, is not stopping 28 democratic European countries form joining to form a single market of 500 million people. The EU has and may improve association agreements with non-European countries on the southern and eastern borders of the Mediterranean rim, but differences and distinctions between the two will not thereby disappear, the more so if economic disparities increase rather than decrease.

As the political systems are widely divergent, with no parliamentary democracy having taken root in most Middle East states, such differences would continue to exert suspicion and induce tensionor misunderstanding. One possible safety value could be the European Mediterranean itself, as it is quite wrong to posit the European mainland against the Mediterranean, or vice-versa. Former island colonies such as Malta and Cyprus, both in the EU, could be well poised to act as mediators and brokers to the South and to the East of this otherwise beautiful and congenial sea, what the Romans, who influenced many of our notions of law, called *Mare Nostrum,* which centuries later became one of Signor Mussolini's slogans and more recently a migrant saving network.

Other differences relate to language. These differences exist within Europe itself, as the Latin roots of European languages are by no means common to all there. Few non-Greeks would be able to read Greek today; and nobody knows exactly where the Basque language even comes from. Arabic has a more commonly intelligible foundation so far as its classical Koranic version goes, *the fosdqa,* but otherwise it too is split into dialects or quasi-national languages, are sometimes not easily understood even among Arabs, who in any case might prefer to think of themselves as Egyptians, Kurds or Persians.

This is not to under-estimate the potential divisiveness of language in infra-European contexts, and the residual fears of an imposed uniformity and sameness under the aegis of what can be seen as a new imperialism: globalisation. Such tensions refer not simply to English vis-a-vis other international European languages – French, Portuguese, Spanish; even German – but they have sometimes been causes of long-lasting splits in socio-political confrontations with many implications transforming what would be a more natural geographical, if not ecological, scenario.

A case in point would be Malta where the sustained British attempts to anglicize and de-Italianize, at all costs after 1880, coupled with the insistence on raising the non-literary vernacular into a standard language, mainly as a means for English penetration (on the Macaulay principle first advocated for India in the mid-19th century), itself led to the formation of political parties. Divide and rule; but also an incipient modernising plurality mobilized into action, with long-lasting consequences.

The presence of French, British and Italian empires in the region for nearly two centuries might have given the familiar impression that Algeria was actually French; Egypt, British; or Tripolitania, Italian. One of the lingering sources of division in the Mediterranean is undoubtedly the imperial past, the colonial legacies and memories, as a result of which much blood has been shed.

At the same time, what appear as local irregularities could converge and assume a commonality, as for example in harbour-driven outposts of empire, where a tug-of-war ensues between annexation to, or separation from, the nearest *terra ferma*. In the case of Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus that was Spain, Italy and Greece. It is thus a similarity with a difference, which lingers on in modified forms to this day.

The great pity is that so many independent nation-states around the Mediterranean rim, particularly to the south and east, but also until all too recently in the Balkans, have not settled down and come to terms with themselves in any properly democratic sense: they have continued to experience in varying degrees repression, tension, violence, under-development uncertainty. In terms of cultural resonance, tourism has been like water over a

duck's back, if not a source of added tension to fundamentalist believers who may object to such things as exposure of the human body on the beach, or indeed an uncovered woman's face. The much-lauded European pluralism, be it political or legal, religious or economic, has been all too slow in coming. Moreover, to the extent that this has been forthcoming, any ill-advised Western initiatives perceived as partial bullying might well risk pushing it into reverse gear, thereby stiffening and riveting it; and possibly creating a new phenomenon altogether, which would reach well beyond the Mediterranean shores and hinterlands.

III. Some Conclusions

In spite of all difficulties, including certain turns of event which may temporarily seem unsurmountable or cruelly disillusioning, an ongoing European-Mediterranean rapprochement and indeed structured cooperation, is an historical imperative. More so in this day and age, where inter-dependence has become so vital and inescapable. With a veto handing overhead like the sword of Damocles, Malta's initiative at the CSCE in Helsinki and subsequently may have seemed audacious, but in fact, as finally concurred, there can hardly be effective peace and security in Europe without peace and security in the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean has been 'the Middle Sea' and what happens on one shore is likely to affect what goes on across from it. This is a lesson of history, in peace and in war, in trade and in commerce, in migration and in settlement. The dependence is often mutual, be that in markets, in resources or in international accords. If I may mention just one or two examples: North African and Middle Eastern oil may well be necessary for European manufacturing and energy supplies; but an oil spill due to negligence or violence could very well ruin the tourist industry and desalinization by reverse osmosis or otherwise, on the northern no less than on the southern shores of this Middle Sea. For islands and island states caught in between, it could simply spell ruin.

Jockeying for power and position or even doctrinal or political ideology is one thing, but throwing caution to the winds and destroying the prospects of stability, of security and of living together is quite another. The absence of mutuality and reciprocity is a scenario that must be avoided at all costs, and that in everyone's interest. After all millions of Europeans have lived in Northern Africa for generations, just as millions of Arabs, not all of them Muslims, seek out a future in European countries in our own times.

Ultimately what has to be addressed is institutional governance, including dispositions towards corruption, greed, undue interference, megalomania and mismanagement. Some form of international monitoring over the supply of

arms and funds to extremist groups, who seem set on rekindling a reprehensible behaviour which one had assumed was buried in the annals of time going back centuries, is evidently called for, whether the financial backers and sources of such intolerant sectarian atrocities be states, individuals or other entities. Clearly one is not dealing here simply with arms captured from vanquished victims.

For the rest, it remains largely true to say that there is no place like home, however globalized the world may have become. But home must be livable. A sense of alienation and uprooting, plus mass media brainwashing, could conceivably be motivations for disaffected youngsters being drawn into an organized, militarily-propelled messianic blood-curling suppression, indeed extermination, of difference and dissidence. Although the work of a successfully resurgent extremist minority on the ground, or an omnipresent statism,   that just about puts paid to consultative dialogic ideals enshrined in declarations and structures such as those envisaged in Barcelona for European-Mediterranean relations and understanding through inter-cultural even inter-faith initiatives, and mutually beneficial socio-economic set-ups, including ongoing cultural exchanges.

Equally, and now more than ever, regional inter-governmental networking and NGO initiatives need to persevere and persist in peace-driven dialogic activity, wherever possible, retaining in our case a focus on European-Mediterranean prospects.

In conclusion, and in the absence of other realizable remedies, perhaps we may take some comfort from the didacticism of poetry.

Immediately after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which led to Nasser's resignation, the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani wrote verses denouncing the abuse of power which were recited and sung throughout the Arab world, outraging the scribes of the state and the secret police in every Arab capital:

If I knew I'd come to no harm,

And could see the Sultan,

This is what I would say:

Sultan,

Your wild dogs have torn my clothes

Your spies hound me

Their eyes hound me

Their noses hound me

Their feet hound me

They hound me like Fate

Interrogate my wife

And take down the name of my friends.

Sultan,

When I came to your walls

And talked about my pains,

Your soldiers beat me with their boots...

Half of our people are without tongues,

What's the use of a people without tongues?

Half of our people

Are trapped like ants and rats

Between walls...

Democracy could be conceived in various ways, but essentially more related to the ballot box than the barrel of a gun. The group who kidnapped an Egyptian diplomat after a mosque service in Baghdad on 23rd July 2004, so that Egypt would not help Iraq improve its security apparatus, called themselves 'The Lions of God's Battalions'. When they released him some days later, they gave him a string of prayer beads – and a dagger. We are now seeing much worse.

But as has well been said, hope springs eternal in the human breast. Rudyard Kipling was the poet laureate in a onetime domineering British Empire, which every once colonized subject knows about, but his 'If', published in 1910, remains a potent stoic, paternal reminder of the need for perseverance, for self-respect, and for a fresh start when things go wrong:

If you can dream – and not make dreams your master;

If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim;

If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster

And treat those two imposters just the same;

If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken

Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,

Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken.

And stoop and build them up with worn-out tools;

If you can make one heap of all your winnings

And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss.

And lose, and start again at your beginnings….

In the face of disruptive warring intrusions which darken the horizon, neither European nor Arab nations can afford to lower their guard. At the same time, security fears cannot serve as a pretext for the curtailment of fundamental human rights. This is an uneasy balance but, on the strength of past experience, if civilized norms are to prevail, it is a necessary one.

A History of Cultural Interaction

By Sahar Hamouda

We are always faced with the perennial question: Is the Mediterranean a bridge between cultures, or does it divide them? Sadly, it is both, but I would rather focus on the factors that unite us.

Since ancient times, through trade and conquests, habits and religions have crossed the sea to link cultures on one another and enrich each other.

The worship of the Egyptian goddess Isis spread in Europe, but she reached the United States in a different way. In the 19th century, the French sculptor Bartholomie was commissioned by Khedive Ismail to make a statue for the Suez Canal. Bartholomie was fascinated by Isis Pharia, goddess of the ancient lighthouse and of sailors. He sketched the statue but it was never executed because of lack of funds. He then proposed the statue to the French, and it now stands on Ellis Island as the icon of modern times – the Statue of Liberty.

Another god in Alexandria is an example of the fusion of cultures and worship. Serapis, the Alexandrian god, was a fusion of the Greek god Zeus and the Egyptian god Osiris. He was accepted by all and worshipped throughout the Hellenistic period.

Ancient Greek colonies – with their buildings, statues, artefacts, worship, language, manners and customs – dotted the Mediterranean, and were followed by the equally numerous Roman cities across the two sides of the Mediterranean.

In the modern period, I would like to talk about Alexandria as an example of cultural interaction, showing how people of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds lived and worked together. Alexandria

> "was a nice, friendly town basking in the sunshine and cool Mediterranean breeze, and in the summer its streets smelled of jasmine which little Arab boys sold threaded into necklaces. Alexandria had plenty of character - characters, rather - Italian, French, Maltese, Turkish, even White Russians, to say nothing of Copts, Pashas, Effendis, and bird-brained but so devoted Sudanese servants. The grocers were Greek, the shoemakers were Armenians, and the Lebanese were everywhere. The British army used to play polo and complain about the heat." (Jacqueline Carol, Cocktails and Camels, Alexandria, Bibliotheca Alexandrina p. 17)

The founding of modern Egypt in 1805 was Mohamed Ali – a foreigner – an Ottoman subject who came from Cavalla in Macedonia. Egypt was then part of the Ottoman Empire, under which the millet system allowed foreigners to worship freely. The millet system, the Capitulations which granted foreigners

privileges, and the policy of Mohamed Ali, all encouraged foreigners from around the Mediterranean and beyond to flock to Alexandria. Without doubt, Alexandria was built and enriched by its foreign communities. In return for the security it offered, they brought it wealth.

Because of time considerations, I will limit myself to only a few examples of how Alexandrians lived, worked and ate together.

To commemorate the death of Queen Victoria, the citizens of Alexandria – not the British colonial powers – founded the British school Victoria College in 1901. The school archives reflect what a rich mosaic of foreigners and faiths Alexandria was: there were Ethiopian, Russian, Georgian and Albanian Orthodox Christians. There were Italian, Maltese, Dutch, German, Hungarian and Russian Roman Catholics. There were British Anglicans, Catholics, and Presbyterians, Irish Catholics, as well as Swiss, German, Dutch, and Czechoslovakian Protestants. The Moslems came from Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Transjordania, India, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Cyprus. The Jews came from Palestine, Greece, Brazil, Austria, Chile, Turkey, Iraq, France, England, Morocco, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Russia. The Egyptians were Moslem, Christian and Jewish.

This ethnic and denominational diversity not only lived together, but was also buried together. In the same neighbourhood, the following were buried side by side in their own cemeteries: there were two Jewish cemeteries, three Anglicans, one Coptic Orthodox, one Greek Orthodox, and one Armenian Orthodox. Then there was one Syrian Catholic, one Armenian Catholic and two Latin Catholic cemeteries. The Moslems lay in the same area, across the road. In Alexandria, officially a city in a Moslem country, there was also a cemetery for the free thinkers, lying next to the others.

A single example of working together would be the creation of the Egyptian cinema industry, which started in Alexandria and grew to be the largest in the world. Here is a list of firsts in Alexandria, demonstrating how Egyptians and foreigners worked together to establish and innovative and lucrative industry:

- 1st screening of motion picture in Egypt was in Alexandria, one year after the Lumiere brothers showed the first motion picture in Paris
- 1st cinema hall in Egypt was inaugurated in Alexandria in 1897
- 1st short cinematic film was made in Alexandria in 1907 by the Syrian Aziz Bandarli and the Italian Umberto Dorez
- The directors of the 1st short narrative film were Italians, in Alexandria
- 1st specialized cinema magazine was in Alexandria, Cinegraph Journale, in French
- 1st production company was founded in Alexandria by Italian investors and the Banco di Roma

- 1st cine club was founded by the Lama brothers, Palestinians (1926)
- 1st female director directed her film in 1929, Alexandrian
- 1937, the 1st Greek speaking films, directed by the Italian Jew Togo Mizrahi

The list goes on, but it is significant that those who founded the Egyptian cinema in Alexandria were a mix of Italians, Frenchmen, Syrians, Palestinians, Greeks, and of course Egyptians – Alexandrians all. The cinema industry soon became the second source of foreign currency, after cotton.

With diversity and wealth came a rich cuisine that partook of all those cultures. In the oral cookbook of our mothers, hands stretched out across the Mediterranean to pass the salt, from Mediterranean coast to coast. The cosmopolitan Alexandrian experience was not limited to shared dinner tables and kitchens, but extended to eateries and the streets. Baklava, finikia, panitone, kaak, marron glace, tarama, tahini, falafel, dolma, stuffed vine leaves were all consumed with equal relish. All shared trials and tribulations, feasts and funerals, meals and recipes.

A great favourite in Alexandria is ice-cream, called gelati. The most loved ice-cream is mastic gelati: the word is Italian, the flavour Greek!

Fresca, from the Italian meaning "fresh", are caramelized sesame, peanut or pistachio wedged between two small wafers smeared with honey. Fresca is not known in Italy, but it is sold all along the Mediterranean coast of Egypt. Like Serapis, it is an example of the fusion of cultures, this time in gastronomy.

I have talked about the past. The present is very different. What we hope to do in these few days is explore how we can make the future more like the past.

From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership towards a Geopolicy of the Wider Euro-Mediterranean Area as a 'Functional Space'[4]

By Bernd Thum

In a lecture given in 2013 in Dehli Pascal Lamy, formerly Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), said: "Geopolitics is back". He was calling for a "multi-lateral rule making" in consideration of the interests of all partners in the framework of a – so again his formulation – "functional international order". In this sense I would like to talk about the Mediterranean, precisely about the Euro-Mediterranean area as a 'functional space'.

I propose to distinguish between 'classic' geopolitics on the one hand and 'new' multilateral, cooperative geopolitics on the other hand. Classic geopolitics is a political concept and a political reality: They are unilateral, aimed at enforcing only own interests and they are 'objectivist', i.e. they understand other countries, societies and cultures only as objects for the own interest-based action, while the 'new' geopolitics are multilateral, cooperative, non-objectivist and respect existing functional structures.

The remainder of this exposé is structured as follows:

1. The concept of a 'functional space' and its relevance for a multilateral, cooperative and non-objectivist geopolicy
2. The Mediterranean area as an object of 'classic' and perhaps 'post-classic' geopolitics
3. How can the wider Euro-Mediterranean area, from Dublin to Damascus, from the Niger to the North Cape, be perceived as a functional space? Some social, economic and cultural references
4. Which geopolicy should be proposed for the wider Euro-Mediterranean area?

In times of tensions and conflicts that currently exist in and around the Mediterranean, it is difficult to conceive the Euro-Mediterranean area as a 'functional space'. But as the references in step 3 will show this term seems legitimate. The present paper is directed to support the emergence of a habitus aimed at perceiving the world in the north and south of the Mediterranean as a structured whole as well as to make a contribution to fostering a geopolitical

---

[4] This is a shortened English version of an article by the author: Bernd Thum: Eine Geopolitik funktionaler Räume. Der erweiterte Euro-Mediterrane Raum als Beispiel. In: WIKA-Report 2 (2014), Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, S. 17-35, http://issuu.com/conbrioverlag/docs/wika-report_band2?e=4067582/10417573.

horizon which allows orientation towards a holistic strategic action in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The concept of a 'geopolicy of functional spaces' should help to do so.

1. The concept of a 'functional space' and its relevance for a multilateral, cooperative and non-objectivist geopolicy

A geographically defined space is not necessarily identical to a 'functional space'. Not physical features such as oceans or mountains, not biological features, such as the dissemination of the olive tree, not climatic similarities, not political boundaries determine the extent and the nature of the functional space, but the intensification, densification of communications, interactions and interrelations through the exchange of material and immaterial goods, through cooperation and collaboration, as well as an at least partially common perception of the area and its history. Even conflicts can be an indication of the existence of a functional space. A functional space is defined by the "quality of action" (as Hannah Arendt said) and therefore by thinking, acting and communicating human beings. Its boundaries are not abstract lines, they evolve and change with the intensity of mutual relations between the actors in culture (even in cultural conflicts), economy, personal encounters (migration, mobility) and long-term, sustainable mutual interests. 'Functional' areas are not least part of the collective experience, individual beliefs and public discourse. The concept of a 'functional space' thus also includes socio-spatial aspects, where social, economic, but also cultural and "symbolic capital" in terms of Pierre Bourdieu plays an important role.

Functional spaces should not be confused with cultural areas. Not 'cultures' define them, although – due to the intensified communications and interactions – certain cultural patterns as well as contents of knowledge are evolving throughout history and continue to emerge in a functional space. But with its web of relations the functional space spans across the cultural areas which belong to it.

2. The Mediterranean area as an object of 'classic' and perhaps 'post-classic' geopolitics

The Mediterranean area is a severely suffering object of 'classic' geopolitics.

Are there other forms than the unilateral 'objectivist' access that are closely related to classic geopolitics? There is the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), a coalition of 43 countries of the European Union and the 'Arab World' plus Turkey and Israel. This relationship provides at least a chance of a multilateral partnership policy – even if this opportunity is hardly noticed. However, both the status and the practice of the Union open our eyes to a spatial structure, which extends beyond the Mediterranean in the classic sense, i.e. the area of the

Mediterranean Sea and its coastal countries and landscapes, namely northwards to Scandinavia, in a westward direction to the Atlantic states of Europe, eastwardly to the countries of the Levant, and in a southward direction to the Saharan regions. This is the wider Euro-Mediterranean area.

Are we living in the Union for the Mediterranean in a geographical-political entity that is defined only by national borders? Yes, in a certain sense, but the Mediterranean area, extended and in part politically structured by the Union for the Mediterranean from Dublin to Damascus, from the southern, Saharan border of Algeria to the North Cape, is not only what a superficial view of the Union and a shallow understanding of politics suggest. It is not only a political space in the strict sense of the word, but also a space that is shaped by high mutual, albeit asymmetrical interdependence, by high mobility and migration, and by dense communications (even about cultural orientations and values) as well as a in parts common, though culturally specific knowledge. This area is a common, albeit conflictual, space of social, political, economic and above all cultural topics. The Union for the Mediterranean opens up the classic Mediterranean area, but, alas, imperfectly, because parts of this area, from which significant energies emanate, are not included. I am thinking about Saharan and Sahel Africa, which are closely linked to the classic Mediterranean area and to Europe, by history, language, culture, education, energy potential, migration as well as security issues. Many, if not the majority of migrants today come from Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa countries.

For all this reasons I would like to call the area from Dublin to Damascus, from the Niger to the North Cape a 'functional space'. I think new geopolitics should take this term into account. Concerning the geopolitical status of the Union for the Mediterranean this status can no longer be called 'classic', for in this union you will find elements of a multilateral structure, a way of thinking in terms of partnership and – at least in the rhetoric of the Constitutive Act – the consideration of functional structures. Notwithstanding that the new 'geopolicy of functional spaces' is not yet implemented in the Union for the Mediterranean, maybe one could talk of it at least as an example of 'post-classic' geopolitics.

Europe must ask itself what the common Euro-Mediterranean area from Dublin to Damascus, from the Niger to the North Cape strategically and geopolitically means beyond the traditional support activities in the framework of foreign aid. 'Strategically' does not (only) mean militarily, but also culturally, economically, demographically... So in this context 'strategically' means in another more sophistical sense 'politically'.

The question we should ask ourselves again and again is: What's politics? In our context, politics should not be understood as day-to-day politics, not even as a method of enforcement of specific interests and power structures. Just as the

word 'politics' is used here in this paper, it is based on the origin of the word as well as the concept of the 'Polis', the association of citizens in ancient Greece. The task of the polis was the regulation of public life by a community of the free and the equal, with its own laws and institutions. Politics is understood in this paper as a way of thinking and acting, which is aimed at the production, the safeguarding and the development of a lasting, sustainable ordering of societies.

Strategically, it is therefore important to find and to realize in and for the wider Mediterranean area – the Euro-Mediterranean space within the scope, which is outlined in this paper – a just, lasting and sustainable ordering of human and social life.

3. How can the wider Euro-Mediterranean area – from Dublin to Damascus, from the Niger to the North Cape – be perceived as a functional space? Some social, economic and cultural references

Usually, first we think about the social, economic and – in a narrow sense – political factors of the Euro-Mediterranean area, but – according to the structure of a functional space of intensified relations – we must take cultural factors into account, too. As social and economic factors are to be mentioned – below I list some examples and key words:

1. The presence of a large diaspora of people from the south in the northern countries of the area. This means an intensive transfer of persons, knowledge, material goods and money.
2. The energy supply, i.e. the dependence of the north from the south in the age of fossil fuels as well as the energy needs of the south in the future. Due to political tensions in Eastern Europe, the interest in oil and gas from the south will increase. The energy factor is closely linked with environmental and climate factors.
3. Demographic trends, directly related with youth unemployment and migration – the latter being characterized by unfortunately increasingly dramatic dimensions. Given the declining number of the working-age population in the north there are new opportunities.
4. Security issues due to social instability. They force the north and the south not only to collaborative, jointly organized security structures of the classic type, but also to work together on issues like unemployment, fighting against corruption, the socio-cultural significance of religion as well as conceptions of statehood.
5. Mutual economic interests. Those have intensified in Europe because of the higher economic growth rates in the south. The south benefits from the Mediterranean tourism, which recovers again despite the crisis, as well as from the re-location of production units.

I come now to some cultural factors that constitute the functional wider Euro-Mediterranean area:

1. The regions of the wider Euro-Mediterranean area have a common history in many areas.
2. The Euro-Mediterranean area was a colonial space coined by European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries. Consequently, the countries of this region have a partially common heritage of 'modern' cultural knowledge. In North Africa, in the Sahara region and in parts of sub-Sahara Africa the French language plays a central role as a second language. The economic and intellectual elites communicate in French. 85% of French-speaking world's population in 2050 will be Africans.
3. The dynamic Euro-Mediterranean Area has its epicenter in the 'classic' Mediterranean area, with its historic civilizations, its monotheistic religions, and its cultural encounters between the North and the South, the East and the West. Indeed, spiritual energies which can be found in the cultural manifestations, political concepts, religious discourses and specific forms of life radiate still as a cultural impact to all areas of the Wider Euro-Mediterranean Area.
4. As I have mentioned above, even cultural conflicts can constitute a functional space. Political Islam is actually, in many respects, a part of Europe. Conversely, enlightenment and other discourses of the North – such as secularism, identitarism, rationalism, technicism, hedonism etc. – are a part of the Arab and African world. There they astonish the Europeans often with extremely sharp contours.
5. There is a strong, emotive charisma of mutual attraction. To name just one example: The home ownership of thousands of Europeans in the Medina of Marrakech shows how Europeans try to turn their dream of the 'Orient' into reality. In the South, despite all criticism, there is a fascination with Europe, which refers primarily to freer forms of life.

4. Which geopolicy should be proposed for the Wider Euro-Mediterranean Area?

'Geopolicy of functional spaces' requires a constant effort to identify the functional interplay of actions and actors and to make them the basis of political thought and action. This should be done in the sense of the ancient Greek 'Polis', as we understand it, in form of an association of free and equal citizens and a just and sustainable ordering of coexistence and living together.

However, also functional spaces need institutions. 'Geopolicy of functional spaces' should seek them, but they must not become autonomous structures of power.

In 2005 the Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), a network of Euro-Mediterranean think tanks, has proposed a concept which should be developed further. The concept does not refer to all states of the wider Euro-Mediterranean area. Rather, it is based on a variable geometry of this area aimed to create a "common frame, a joint work and cooperation platform", giving a "horizon" to the policy of at least some countries in the region, including Europe. The authors of the concept insist on the "multilateral" character of the structure. "Key concepts" are: "access, participation and solidarity". One of the authors, Andreu Bassols, Director General of the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) in Barcelona, wrote: "The triple aspect of access to Europe, participation in certain policy areas and institutions, but also the dimension of solidarity, together with concrete and substantial political action should be the basic structure of a close relationship with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean [...]"[5]. I think that we could start with a variable geometry with a community of states which – in consideration of their cultural traditions – accomplish certain standards of democracy, separation of powers and the rule of law and human rights – the latter in a trans-cultural interpretation.

In addition, the wider Euro-Mediterranean area as a functional space needs also a symbolic capital. The semantic potential of this area should be identified, further developed and systematically disseminated to the public. This includes not only the classic cultural heritage of Europe, but also that of the Arab- and African-Islamic World. This common and at the same time diverse cultural heritage should be integrated in significant parts in a Euro-Mediterranean knowledge space.[6] In addition it can merge into a common narrative. This is not possible without an intensive cross-cultural dialogue, without a resolute review and reorganization of knowledge, without a new way of thinking and talking in new terms, no without substantial values which need to be carefully identified. No less important are friendship and trust.[7]

---

[5] Andreu Bassols: L'Europe et les (r)évolutions arabes. In: Bernd Thum (Dir.): Au tournant d'une époque – L'Europe, la Méditerranée et le monde arabe (2013). Stuttgart: Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen, S. 18, French:
http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/edition/zeitenwende_fr.pdf / German:
http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/edition/zeitenwende.pdf.
[6] This is what the Foundation Euro-Mediterranean Knowledge Space (Stiftung Wissensraum Europa-Mittelmeer – WEM), which was founded in October 2010 at the National Library in Rabat, Morocco, tries to realize. Its objective is not only the exchange of knowledge between the north and the south, but a partial integration of knowledge, the dissemination of this knowledge the public as well as the creation of a new narrative (http://www.wem-fondation.org / Short introduction in English: http://www.wissensraum-mittelmeer.org/mediapool/94/948361/data/WEM_Darstellung_engl_11-2-14.pdf.
[7] Concerning the very important role of cultural policy in a "Geopolicy of functional spaces" see the German basis text of this paper as indicated in Note 5.

The Migratory Question in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Groundwork for Debate

By Yamina Bettahar

I will highlight three main points:

1. Why and how is this question part of the agenda of our conference?
2. What is mainly at stake?
3. Opening elements to feed our debate what can we do in the Mediterranean space to resolve this issue?

1. Why and how is this question part of the agenda of our conference?

The migratory phenomenon is an old phenomenon (is not new in itself) and is accompanied by common imagination that has been lasting over the centuries: Foreigners continue to fascinate and frighten Europeans at the same time (between acceptance and rejection).

But things have changed. What is new is the nature of migration flows, the scope and diversity of the categories of migrants?

Today, migration is a global issue that affects all countries worldwide.

It is a complex affair: The migrant goes through different forms of mobility, migration strategies, possible destinations and relationship patterns in the host country and the country of origin.

More recently, the political changes following the fall of the Berlin Wall, combined with the economic, social and political problems of emerging countries in the Mediterranean area, as well as the mistrust that these peoples have towards their political regimes have severely weakened how attractive Europe could be and have strengthened the wish by migrants to find an Eldorado.

What is Europe's response to these migration flows?

Europe is facing both an economic crisis and a deep and lasting social crisis: the first way Europe is responding to this growing migratory demand, is strengthening controls and building walls.

Implementation and strengthening of outsourcing measures for the control of exterior frontiers in the Schengen Area (Sea horse Atlantic network program of cooperation between FRONTEX and third countries, new generation of

Euromed programs policy which was to be implemented from 2014 and the WAPIS program (West African Police Information System).

Such programs to fight against illegal immigration were requested to be reinforced and extended to new third countries.

However, the migratory phenomenon from the Mediterranean area to Europe keeps going on legally or illegally.

But migration demand remains high; development of new types of people such as the smuggler who enriches at the expense of migrants.

Part of economic globalization, the international migratory phenomenon has become bigger (in 40 years the migrating population has tripled – 230 Million). It now counts for 3.2% of the world population, and concerns voluntary or forced mobility of people from one country to another.

According to the population department of the United Nations, today, 48% of migrants are women and 20 – 34 account for 28% of international migrants, when the age of 20 represent 15%.

Yet, it is still a limited phenomenon since the number of migrants reached only 3.2% of the world population in the end. This goes against some prejudices.

Europe is the first host continent of international migrants, particularly those coming from the Mediterranean area (North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa...).

2. What is mainly at stake?

Nowadays, the migration question has become a worldwide one. It is at the heart of the ratio of power between states and geopolitical areas.

The migrants are the objects of stakes and conflicts in which political objectives and economic, social, cultural and ethical imperatives are opposed.

Also, the information sources are incomplete, the statistics are inaccurate, the definitions are unclear and their paradigms have evolved (What are we talking about today? What is a migrant compared to an immigrant?).

In Europe there are waves of migration linked to the rise in nationalisms and extremisms of all kinds.

The migrants' profile has changed: It is now more flowing populations, whose contours are hard to apprehend and who are opposed to traditional economic migrants who left their original country to go to a host country for work.

New attraction poles have emerged and also new ethno-cultural and group recompositions; categories are blurred and new figures and situations have appeared.

Who are the new migrants of the 21st century?

Women, children under 18 and alone, economic migrants, refugees, stateless persons, skilled elites, students, with more and more blurred categories (workers, asylum seekers and members of family regrouping, environmentally displaced people especially due to global warming, victims of wars, interior and pendular migrants, border workers, European residents here for half of the year), which highlights interdependence circulating in the world.

What are the acceleration factors of these new international mobilities?

They are numerous and complex:

Generalisation of passports, increasing number of crises and conflicts, progress in education (it has become easier to access higher education in the third world countries) which enabled some teenagers to refuse fatality (harragas), the dream of a better elsewhere and Europe's attraction force in people's imagination, both young and less young, women and minors.

Since the 1990s, new issues related to market logic (globalization, international university market and skills market...).

On a geo-political level, pendular migrations do not mean the same thing anymore: Before, migrants were going from the South to the North (between 120 and 130 million); today it is a more circular phenomenon with South-to-South migrations (for example from Senegal to Marocco) and North-to-South (about 110 million).

It is harder and harder to identify these people because they are very heterogeneous and it is linked to jolting conflicts on the planet and catastrophes, natural or caused by man.

Lack of reliability of the statistics information sources: unclear definitions made even more complex by recent evolutions (wars, civil wars, the displacing of populations...). Blurred distinction between "migrant" and "immigrant".

Brain drain and Brain gain

For countries of origin, the fallouts are positive (monetary transfers by immigrants to their country of origin) and negative (running away of human capital, brain drain).

In Europe, on a demographic level, immigrants tend to limit the decline in populations but not their ageing.

Regarding the question of the migration of the elites, who represent a less important segment of general migratory waves, the paradigm "circulation of competence" has substituted that of the brain drain which served as reference for developing countries in the years 1960 to 1980.

Since the late 20th century, these waves which include heterogeneous skills, composed of graduates, researchers, engineers, doctors, IT specialists, entrepreneurs, etc. have emerged in a more systematic way. A new vision appeared more optimistic, which starts from the idea that these northbound waves of migration have become transnational.

Emergence of "diaspora" networks of a new kind with investment returns via remote connections, the establishment of collaborative networks for the benefit of country of origin. From brain drain to brain gain – If this vision is real, it is however not generalizable because there is still a lot to do!

3. Opening elements to feed our debate what can we do in the Mediterranean space to resolve this issue?

Now a real global stake, the migratory issue contributes to international relations. It redefines the sovereignty of host countries, and requires a new diplomacy calling for a worldwide and regional governance of migrations.

The European policies in terms of managing the migratory flows from the mediterranean area are part of a context of crisis: thus they are often the result of emergency situations and not of planned and strategical policies.

It is true that since 2005 the European Union has made considerable efforts and has been trying to develop a global approach to migrations in order to reach a "triple win" situation (between the needs of the European labor market, stabilizing and securing the migrants' status and supporting the development of their country of origin).

The Union adopted tools and measures to allow candidates to be better informed before leaving. This is especially the case with recent policies about researchers, students and highly-qualified workers in order to secure some of their rights during their stay and also a better recognition of their degrees.

Yet, a lot remains to be done. I'd like to give you some hints:

On the whole

- In The European Union, it is about innovating a new political and social action modality which would be characterized by multiple levels of consultation and negotiation with third countries
- Reinforce the cooperation with these migrants' countries of origin (when it is allowed by the Sovereignity of the State and the geopolitical configuration)
- European countries should lead a common reflection with countries from the Mediterranean area (when it is possible to do so) in order to build a common and ordered policy to manage the migratory flows
- European countries have to rethink the current policy of the Schengen Area and adopt more efficient tools to better control the flows
- Outsourcing the management of flows at frontiers through measures which are implemented or simply being extended (FRONTEX, WAPIS) is not what is best, all the more so as they are the result of emergency situations (Lampedusa, etc.) and they cost a lot in terms of money, human beings and also on a symbolic level. They are not a viable option in the long term
- Developing and implementing a coherent European policy by collaborating and holding a dialogue with the states from the Mediterranean area when it is possible to do so in terms of geopolitics: This, in order to manage the migratory flows more properly because there are always some uncertainties as regards some events happening here and there
- A safe policy is not enough. Europe cannot get off lightly by building walls! Things should be negotiated with the Mediterranean states and we should have a global approach to the problems linked to migration
- Contribute to the strengthening of the help for development given to countries of origin by adopting a case-by-case approach to this question because the political configuration is not the same everywhere, and rethinking the European neighborhood policy and the Union for the Mediterranean
- More specifically, how can the members of foundations play a major role in the globalized landscape for a better management of migratory flows and of a more global approach of the problems and their solving?
- Have an information, communication and pedagogical role by contributing to the organization of debates as often as possible and by mobilizing a pool of European and Mediterranean researchers
- To rely on an objective knowledge in order to intervene in public space; to adress the public opinion and the civil society in order to develop a pedagogical speech by supplying the collective debate with arguments to fight against xenophobic ideas against foreigners
- Take action with the decision-makers and the political parties, neutralize common preconceptions about migratory invasion and false information conveyed by nationalist groups in order to get more voters and to establish a fear climate

Finally, it is necessary to widen the dialog and the consultation to actors from the civil society in these countries. The new forces which have recently emerged in the different fields after the collective rallying in Tunisia, in Greece etc. may be efficient mediation groups in helping to solve the problems linked to migrations.

40

Tracing a Syrian Asylum Seeker Route

By Robert Attalah

"What if I died in the sea? At least there's a possibility of a life afterwards."
A Syrian asylum seeker during an interview

Station 1: A Historical Background

On the 2nd of November 1956 during the military confrontation between Egypt on one side, and Britain, France, Israel on the other, the main transmitters of the Egyptian national radio station had been severely damaged. In response, Syria's national radio station announced "this is Cairo" instead of "this is Damascus", as a sign of solidarity between the two nations. On the 22nd of February 1958 Egypt and Syria declared their union, forming a short-lived country named the "United Arab Republic" (UAR), fulfilling the dream of Egypt's president at the time (Gamal Abd Al Nasser) of uniting the Arabs. On 28th September 1961, a group of Syrian officers led a coup and declared Syria independent from the UAR, which marked an era of diminishing pan Arabism, as countries shifted to nationalism where the best interests of each country trumped unification dreams.

Fifty years later, in 2011 a new kind of virtual union started when a wave of demonstrations and protests took place to topple a number of Arab leaders, one of which was the Syrian regime. A survey conducted by "Gallup World" in December 2011 showed that 56% of Egyptians supported the Syrian protests against Bashar Al-Assad, 31% said they do not know and only 12% were against, indicating fairly good support for the Syrian uprising at that time.

The Syrian protests against the regime were also supported by the Egyptian government, this support reached its peak during the last days of Mohamed Morsi's rule (the Freedom and Justice Party – the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate and winner of the Egyptian elections 2012) when he not only announced the end of diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime but shortly after stated that "the Egyptian people and army are supporting the Syrian uprising".

A couple of weeks later mass protests spread across Egypt to oust Morsi, and General Abdelfatah El-Sisi announced that the president had "failed to meet the demands of the Egyptian people" and declared that the constitution would be suspended.

The ousting of Morsi coupled with the political polarization of Egyptians supporting the army, consequently deteriorated the situation of Syrians seeking asylum in Egypt. People were quick to link Syrian protests to the Muslim

Brotherhood and thus they turned against Syrians particularly after some Syrians alleged participation in protests supporting the ousted president Morsi. On the 8th of July 2013 visa restrictions and security clearances were imposed on all Syrians causing a virtual freeze of new Syrian arrivals.

Station 2: Living under Reservations

Legislation

Although Egypt had signed and ratified the 1951 convention, it had entered reservations to the following articles, making them inapplicable in Egypt: Articles 12 (1), articles 20 and 22 (1), and articles 23 and 24. These cover personal status, unequal treatment of refugees compared to nationals if there is a rationing system in Egypt; and access to public relief, but the two articles having the greatest impact on refugee populations living in Egypt are Article 22 on free primary education and Article 24 on employment. For these reasons alone refugees in Egypt have no chance for "integration"! In addition, Egypt has no local legislation regarding refugees.

Protection

Egyptians have been polarized during and after the political crisis that started on the 30th of June 2013. This polarization led to a shift in perceptions of and sympathies towards the Syrian community. Some perceptions fed by the media have led to the belief that Syrians against the regime in Syria have engaged and aligned with supporters of the ousted former Egyptian president Morsi. Other obstructions have included visa restrictions which saw a number of planes carrying Syrians return to their country of departure (flight 203 arriving to Egypt from the Syrian airport Latakia (LTK) was not allowed to disembark and consequently returned to Syria).

Administrative and arbitrary detentions continue to be a concern for Syrians, not only due to illegal (it is illegal according to the Egyptian law) departures by sea, but also for those not able to regularize their residence in Egypt. Some positive steps by the authorities have been observed since the beginning of 2014 to release detained Syrians registered with UNHCR; however administrative and arbitrary detention continues to be a concern. Since January 2014, UNHCR is aware of the arrest of 325 Syrian individuals in Egypt for illegally attempting to leave the country by sea.

Livelihood

According to the latest Joint Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Egypt savings were considered the main financial resource for Syrian refugees arriving to Egypt. These savings have significantly depleted. As for Syrians who arrived in

Egypt in 2013 their savings had been exhausted as a result of prior periods of displacement either inside Syria or in Lebanon.[8]

The majority of Syrian refugees in Egypt have been facing challenges in responding to their basic household needs. Limited financial capacity, increases in prices and rent costs, and the drop in the level of sympathy of the host community towards Syrian refugees have led to deteriorating living conditions of Syrian households. As a result, they are facing homelessness, evictions, food insecurity, school dropout, and security threats.

Food Security

Since the start of its food voucher assistance to Syrian refugees in Egypt in February 2013, the World Food Programme (WFP) was able to scale-up assistance from 7.000 Syrian refugees to 95.000. However due to the current funding shortage, the assistance will be scaled back down till 65.000 individuals.

Station 3: The Death Trip

According to the latest socio-economic assessment conducted late 2014 – present, the majority of Syrian households stated that one of their family members attempted to migrate outside Egypt. 3500 migrants had lost their lives in 2014. 700 migrants feared dead in Mediterranean shipwreck last Sunday.[9]

Station 4: Outsourcing Asylum

EU decisions related to outsourcing migration control and status determination for asylum seekers coming from "safe" transit countries should start from the following:

- Making sure these are actual "safe" countries
- Taking the opinion of the civil society and public into consideration in addition to the government

Note: Egypt doesn't have an elected parliament or a time frame for elections.

---

[8] The joint assessment was coordinated by Ziad Ayoubi/UNHCR livelihood officer in November 2013, the participating organizations were UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, WHO, IOM, Save the Children, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Catholic Relief Services, Africa and Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA), Egyptian foundation for Refugee Rights, Caritas Egypt, Arab Council for Supporting Fair Trials and Resala Association.
[9] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/19/700-migrants-feared-dead-mediterranean-shipwreck-worst-yet

Towards a New Political Order

By Rupert Graf Strachwitz

On the 9th of June this year, Europe commemorated the 200th anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The 121 articles, signed by almost all European powers – and incidentally by no one else – , put an end to what has come to be known as the Napoleonic Wars, rearranged what had formerly been the Holy Roman Empire and settled a plethora of other territorial matters. More importantly, the Congress of Vienna settlement accomplished in practical politics what had been developed in political theory for 250 years or more: the notion of the absolute supremacy of the nation state. This formed the framework for international politics and remained the guideline for the vast majority of political moves and strategies until nearly the end of the 20th century. It served as a model for organisations such as the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945, and for emerging states outside Europe, including the Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Like in Vienna, borders were drawn on maps, and the people were ordered to become nations. It persists today in international sports, when flags are hoisted and anthems are sung; and it persists to an extraordinary degree in the European Union, when the Council tries to agree on any matter that comes up.

The supremacy of national states and their governments is still seen by governments and experts in constitutional and international law as the very notion of legitimacy. In Germany in particular, theorists like Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose thinking dominated German political thinking for two centuries, argued that the whole of society could only reach its fulfilment in the idea of the national state. Entities that were less or more than that were and sometimes still are considered to be behind the times, in need of further development, or simply irrelevant. To give just one example: German federalism was thought of as exotic at best and deficient at worst by nearly all its neighbours and indeed by many Germans, too.

Striking parts of this story are that for one, a common ethnicity was increasingly considered to be a vital component of a nation state, as we know, with horrific results, while the model was also being exported to many countries within and outside Europe hitherto organized quite differently. In saying this, I am not argueing against the right of nations to self-determination, but would contend that this right does not necessarily need to conform to boundaries drawn under many different circumstances and only subsequently proclaimed "national". Given the dominance of the Europeans in world politics in the 19th and 20th century, the concept of the nation state has been imposed on people and areas that would not and could not appreciate it, and was adopted by political leaders

to transform societies that held very different beliefs. In other words, the fact that the nation state is quite a recent invention and by no means an anthropological constant, that there are many other successful models by which society can be organized, has been all but erased from our political consciousness.

It is not my place to judge whether this, in individual cases, has been advantageous for the citizens or not. In some cases, it may well have been. But looking at the 24 (or is it 23 or 22) countries around the Mediterranean, the 28 members of the European Union, the 22 members of the Arab League, the 47 members of the Council of Europe, not to mention many individual ‚states', today, it is not difficult to conclude that this whole system no longer fits.

40 years ago, on August 1st, 1975, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act brought the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to a close. In negotiating this act, the inviolability of national frontiers and respect for territorial integrity was so important to the Soviet Union and her allies that they grudgingly agreed to some concessions of human and civil rights. We all know what happened. Civil rights groups like Solidarnosc and Charta 77 mushroomed in Central and Eastern Europe; they were the beginning of modern civil society and became so powerful that by 1989, they brought down the Berlin wall and ousted a whole array of totalitarian regimes. Incidentally, one big reason for this, especially in East Germany, was that citizens were being denied the right to leave the country. 25 years ago, on the 3rd of October, two Germanys united; a few years later, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia split up. What will happen to Syria, Libya, and Spain, we do not know. The United Kingdom was on the brink of splitting up last year. And we need not travel far to be in touch with peoples whose loyalties and sense of ownership are not reflected in a governmental system: Kurds, Palestinians, Corsicans, to name just a few. In all cases, a vibrant civil society is setting the agenda.

Therefore, I would argue that we are not seeing individual nations crumbling for specific reasons, and it is not necessarily happening in the course of power struggles. The system created 200 years ago is collapsing. It is under attack from a new sensation of universalism, from moves to create larger geographical conglomerates, from strong regional feelings, from traditional religious as well as secular alliances and ties, and from an emerging global civil society. All of these create new loyalties, new bonds and bridges. Whether we like them or not, new entities are emerging that bear little resemblance to the states of old: take the Islamic State as an example. Argueably, the currently most ambitious project of political rearrangement, the European Union, will not be completed as long we believe that completion spells the creation of a European nation state. As Robert Menasse has pointed out, we will need to devise a new form.

200 years ago, only days after the Act had been signed in Vienna, Napoleon suffered his final defeat at Waterloo. By an ingenious use of homing pigeons, the Rothchild banking family were in a position to transmit this piece of news to London quicker than anyone else – and quicker than anyone could imagine. Today, we live in a world that permits us to communicate with virtually any other human being around the globe in real time. In 1800, this globe was inhabited by approx. 1 billion people. Today, there are over 7 billion of us around, and more and more of them consider themselves to be individual human beings, citizens and principals who demand to be respected by governments they consider to be their agents rather than ruled by governors, be they elected or self-appointed.

How can we seriously believe we can still continue operating a governmental system at horrendous cost that was certainly not considered to be a piece of disruptive innovation at the time it was set up! And for that matter, how can we ensure long term peace in a system of governments that mistrust their own people in such a paranoid way as our governments do?

In Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, France, Spain, in fact everywhere, people have learnt to speak up, and are teaching us what impact this may have. We no longer succumb, and in many places, we do not exit, we voice our concerns. What I would like to see is an ongoing and universal debate on how best to organize the welfare of the people, the preservation of human liberties and civil rights, the enactment and enforcement of law, and the inevitable use of force, in an innovative way that takes these momentous shifts into account. What I would like to see is our best minds thinking as intensely about a new political and societal model as others are about technical progress to cope with climate change and other challenges. Where are we better served by networks than by institutions? Where are age-old cultural traditions stronger than artificial notions of nationhood? Where do we need new forms of governance to help existing ones out of decades of deadlock? Which tasks should be allotted to the citizen, to civil society, the market, and some level of statehood respectively? How do we become ,us' in a new way?

None of these crucial challenges are being sufficiently tackled! In saying this, I am certainly not dreaming of a world government, as much as some of the issues need global solutions. We, the people, need to identify, to develop ownership; increasingly, this spells inclusion and participation, subsidiarity rather than hierarchy, and neighbourhood rather than the globe. This is what civil society is best at, making people belong; so civil society organisations should have an integrating as well as a watchdog role in a new governance model. We have come to accept a much stronger, more powerful international market. What checks and balances do we need to keep it vibrant, and yet, in a sense, at bay? How do we sensibly allott tasks that need to be completed to local, regional, and larger

area governments and ensure they are properly chosen and controlled? How do we ensure ethical standards, and invite people to be creative, so that we may not miss out on a single good thought? All this is equally legitimate; we must learn to live in and with what Parag Khanna, an American of Indian extraction, has called a new Middle Age.

In short, we must think beyond the idea of nation states, let alone of a special legitimacy vested in them. It is up to us, the citizens, to do the thinking, as individuals, academics, civil society activists, religious leaders, businessmen, civil servants, or whatever. I do not see that anybody else will do the thinking for us.

The (Changing) Role of Civil Society

By Filiz Bikmen

Any attempt to spark a discussion about the role of civil society without first putting forth a working definition is destined for some complications. Indeed, defining civil society has always been challenging, and in almost every setting where such an effort has been made, a long discussion often ensues – one which likely turns on the following three axes:

1. Who civil society is/is not (rights based groups, faith based groups, interest groups, etc.)
2. What civil society is/is not (non profit, non governmental, etc.)
3. How civil society operates (advocacy vs. service delivery, etc.)

While the main topics may remain more or less the same, there does appear to be an increasingly common realization that a binary view of civil society is an outdated one. Lines which were once drawn between sectors, concepts and practices (and in some case, principles) are now blurring, as it becomes more difficult to distinguish the many new forms and functions. And it is within these new forms and functions that we can observe new roles of civil society emerging.

There are three main changes in roles to be noted. One is the emergence of the profit making (and sometimes profit sharing) social enterprise. What may be perceived as a blurred line between the private and civic sector could also be understood as a space in which market dynamics are used to create and sustain solutions (products, services and so on) for the dire economic and social inequities civil society organizations (CSOs) have worked long and hard to address with resources that were once mainly limited to donations and grants. These new organizations are sometimes also referred to as 'hybrids' because they are partly reliant on grants/donations as well as generating some income. The social entrepreneurs who start/lead these enterprises and the impact investors that fund them, together with a host of other organizations which work to develop and support this 'ecosystem' have surely put forth a new topic for discussion with regards to the role of civil society (for those that agree that this is still within the realm of civil society space). We are seeing this shift slowly spread across the Mediterranean region, and the launch of new initiatives such as the Synergos Arab World Social Innovators Program[10] is a prime example of this.

On the financing side, donors which spoke much about the shift from 'charity to strategic philanthropy' 10 years ago are now speaking of a new shift toward

---

[10] http://www.synergos.org/socialinnovators/

impact investing- an approach which seeks to combine social impact with some financial impact (could be a return on investment or not- but in any case, an indication of financial sustainability is sought).

A second shift in the role of civil society is the massive increase in collaborative initiatives with a host of new actors and models. CSOs were once viewed as those that were funded to either deliver certain programs or pursue advocacy initiatives (and sometimes, yet rarely, both at the same time). Now, CSOs are not just recipients of funds but rather increasingly becoming members of global coalitions with other major partners from various sectors, setting and shaping agendas on topics of key importance for social and economic justice. An example of this is the Gucci 'Chime for Change' campaign and initiative, which promotes global equality for women. The communication engine and sponsor is Facebook, in partnership with the mega-foundation of Bill and Melinda Gates. The campaign is underwritten by Gucci and aims to facilitate relationships for CSOs and charities including the Global Fund for Women- among the biggest women's rights fund and funder in the world. Another key partner is the crowdsourcing platform Catapult (also a Gates initiative) where people can choose which CSOs and charities should be funded. As such, that rather parochial relationship model of funders supporting CSO projects appears to be increasingly outdated. And thanks to social media and its users from the 'click generation', funders are no longer lone rangers. Such platforms allow individuals to be much more a part of the funding scene than ever before. And given the global nature of these initiatives and the reach of their partners- particularly Global Fund for Women in this example- there is much greater mobilization of awareness and funds for the many countries in the Med region – particularly some of the Arab countries and Turkey – in which equal rights for women are still way below par.

The third and final major shift in the role of civil society is the shift from producing outcomes to creating impact. It would not be fair to say that this shift is mainly a result of donors which are becoming more 'impact conscious' and thus demanding more from CSOs in terms of impact measurement (though this is of course a factor). Just as important is the fact that the 'wicked problems' civil society aims to tackle are interwoven in increasingly more complex systems which in turn require multiple and parallel approaches. For example, Silatech[11] (a 'hybrid' organization) employs a program strategy approach combining policy advocacy, direct action (services) as well as funding and research to tackle the nebulous problem of youth unemployment in the Arab region, and doing so with very complex systems to track and measure impact, not only outcomes. Other organizations working in Turkey, for example, are now beginning to question in more depth the actual return on investment (in terms of future

---

[11] http://www.silatech.com/

employment) of the millions and millions of dollars spend on educational scholarships for university students. While the number of scholarships given/students supported and their graduation rates were once the most important data points (as proof of output/outcome), now, they seek to track and report the number of students who are successfully able to make the school to work transition (as proof of impact).

Looking at these three shifts, two conclusions can be made, both of which were inspired by the wisdom of Albert Einstein:

One is that "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them". The new roles assumed by civil society also require new funding and engagement strategies. While capacity building has always been a point of discussion (and contention – with a preference of spending more funds on specific projects only), most will accept and recognize that the Arab Spring and other similar movements that followed all the way through to Turkey and the Gezi Park protests, were in fact also a return on the years and years of investment into the institutions of civil society (and their leaders/staff) which helped foster a new generation greater awareness of their rights as citizens and the obligations of the state they live in. Funders and other actors should look at these events to remember the importance of building stronger ecosystems and mechanisms to increase support and resources for such initiatives, and try to think beyond traditionalist funding models which are less relevant in the post-modern era.

The second conclusion is that the obsession with measuring impact should not be overemphasized ("Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts"). Of course it is a positive indication that CSOs are more actively seeking to both measure and achieve impact in a more direct manner. Yet let us not overlook the micro and macro picture as we seek impact. The micro level is the difference made in one individuals' life. And when this is challenged as being too limited, one should remember the power of one person – think of Malala Yousafzai for example. If, through one program in a girls' school, another Malala is inspired, then we have gained so much more than just one. And of course, there is the reality that a great deal of what civil society seeks to change is deeply rooted in systems of injustice on many levels and forms. These are complex and intricate systems which require continuous/focused research and analysis so that new proposals can be put forth to policy makers based on evidence and experience. While the change sought may take many, many years, and thus appear to be limited in impact initially, just one take one court or parliamentary decision can then change the lives of millions...for the better. And this is the impact that we ultimately shall be in pursuit of.

A Long Way to Go before the Mediterranean Becomes Mare Nostrum

By Orhan Silier

The relations between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are determined today by essentially neoliberal policies, the dominance of nation-states, the precedence given by the European Union to the interests of international corporations and the fact that a large part of the African and Middle Eastern states are ruled by authoritarian governments who have little to do with representing their citizens. Unless there is a noteworthy improvement in these basic parameters, the short term, small scale aid programs directed at the countries of the South (the real beneficiaries of which, are, most often, the countries of the North), the slight relaxation of certain immigration policies and the cooperation and partnership programs fielded under various names, will not lead to any appreciable change in the North-South relations.

UNCTAD's latest reports attest to the fact that, regardless of the basic statistical criteria adopted, income inequality is rapidly increasing throughout the world since the 1960s; that this increase parallels the increase in foreign investment in these countries and in the growth of the North-South, West-East trade; and that the fastest growth is registered by the share of the richest 1% of the population in the total wealth. The same data show us that the average prices of goods produced by underdeveloped countries have fallen considerably over the last decades.

The actual levels of aid delivered by the economically best-off nations of the world to the poorest, fall much shorter than the aims set by the United Nations after the Second WW. Only a few European nations, and that for a short period of time, have abided by the advice that the rich nations should use 1% of the GNP for this purpose. In last decades, with the disappearance from the political stage of social democratic leaders like Olaf Palme whose actions matched their rhetoric, and the termination of the competition between different world systems, this issue has ceased to be the subject of international discussion or to appeal to the consciences of policy makers.

The illegal immigration from the South to the North of the Mediterranean is only a small fraction of the total volume of migrations all over the world. The trans-Mediterranean migration is taking place mostly to those richest European countries, who have the capacity to absorb large waves of immigration and who are the former colonisers of those countries in Africa from where the migrants are originating. The greatest opposition to this immigration, even in such countries as Germany, where there were no colonizer-colonized relationship,

originates in ideological approaches, as well as cultural and political structures, rather than the difficulties in creating sufficient employment for the new comers.

The normative values put forward in Europe under the banner of "liberty, equality, fraternity" over the last two centuries, have, to a large extent, ceded their place to haughty, Europe-centred attitudes showing very little regard for other peoples of the world. In 2005, I presented a paper titled "How to deal with a powerful 'intangible legacy' of Europe, namely, nationalism?" to the European Cultural Heritage Forum, at a session where both *Rupert Graf Strachwitz*, one of the organizers of the present meeting, and I were panellists. In this paper, I argued that nationalism was the dominant ideology, not only of the 17 – 20th centuries, but also of the 21st century.

My purpose was to remind the audience that nationalism was an important part of the cultural heritage of Europe, and to stress that a more distanced attitude towards this legacy could only be achieved if "cultural heritage" could be defined as the common material and immaterial heritage of the whole of humanity, rather than from a narrow Western or European-based point of view, and if the political and intellectual history of Europe could be critically re-read within this context. Unless this is done, preservation of cultural heritage with an over-emphasis on glorified national/European history and on material heritage, can easily give rise to isolationism and xenophobia, which can be readily exploited in favour of policies of aggression. I tried to call attention to the fact that nationalism, including all of its extreme manifestations, was born in Europe and exported from there to the rest of the world, that it was still quite a dynamic and very wide spread movement in many different guises. This meant that, for people who claimed to perceive the world from a humanistic framework, it was mandatory to draw a clear demarcation between their own thinking and the especially the racist or openly chauvinistic versions of nationalism. I would like to repeat this message at this conference, which has the sub-title "Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together".

Unlike the first period of rapid globalization between 1870 and 1914, the second stage of very fast globalization after 1970 is marked by the ruthless exploitation of the world's resources by Western capitalism, in order to transform hundreds of thousands of goods and services into global products to be marketed, together with a consumerist life-style and through extremely efficient media, to the whole word, including the very poorest countries. However, neo-liberal policies, in both the industrialised capitalist countries and in the rest of the world, give rise to an extremely inequitable income distribution and a huge gap between the production capacity and the actual consumption (in contrast to the unrealistic expectations of consumption which it provokes). Thus, while it fails to provide the most basic needs to billions of people, it also oppresses and marginalizes

them with unfulfilled expectations, or in some cases drives them to desperate, and at times brutal, revolt against a monolithic and uncaring society.

In this meeting, the plight of hundreds of African and Middle Eastern illegal immigrants who were abandoned to their fate and were drowned in the Mediterranean, was frequently mentioned, and rightly so. Another stream in the opposite direction, an equally revealing one, is meanwhile taking place from various European countries to Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, consisting of second and third generation immigrants living in the main European countries as citizens and intending to join the IS. Tens of thousands of young people are choosing revolt and virtual suicide, a choice involving acts of naked brutality and the most direct violence, which will most probably cost them their lives within one or two years. This second flow involves young people, many of whom are qualified professionals or students, just as in the former case. This movement of people in two opposite directions is a measure of the success of today's capitalism, nation state system and such trans-national projects as the European Union who bred high hopes, which were eventually confined within the narrow framework of a "Europe of corporations".

In the course of breaking the stranglehold of colonialism, the first imposition faced by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin-America, was the totally arbitrary borders and state structures designed by the big powers. As if this were not enough, the newly formed states were forced into a nation-state mold in the West-European style, overlooking the fact that they possessed a much more complex social and cultural structure. In spite of all this, these countries were able to produce their own leaders and political movements. Populist and left parties and leaders such as Nehru, Sukarno, Ben Bella, Lumumba, Tito, Nasser and Castro came to the forefront. This process evolved into the Non-Aligned Countries movement.

These leadership cadres and the movement of Non-Aligned Countries was eradicated step by step by the West, in a very determined and often very bloody process. The Pan-Arab and Pan-Africa Union and cooperation initiatives were sabotaged. From Indonesia to Algeria, from Palestine to the Congo, from Bangladesh to Yugoslavia, local leaders were often liquidated. Even this was not enough; within the 50 year period between 1950 and 2000, military interventions were staged at dozens of countries. Remarkably, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries were immune to such interventions; those Middle Asian countries who are rich in petroleum and natural gas, after half-hearted moves towards democratization, were also included in an invisible cloak of protection. As the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions with extensive media coverage have amply shown, the only winners were the weapons industries of a handful of countries and big international banks. Thus, the ground was laid for a huge escalation of violence throughout the world.

In many countries including my own country, Turkey, "our boys" staged military coups with the support of NATO, CENTO, SEATO and the covert involvement of CIA, M16 and MOSSAD. These coups and the "Green Belt" policy of isolating socialist movements and the Soviet system by nurturing political Islam, not only wreaked havoc on local equilibria between local powers, on the mechanisms and culture of accommodation between different ethnic, religious and cultural identities, but also led to lasting structural consequences.

Given the backdrop of the "modern", impassionate, remote controlled and hygienic killings practiced by latter-day capitalism, to which we are more accustomed, from Hiroshima to Vietnam and Cambodia, from Iraq to Yugoslavia, from Libya, Algiers, Palestine to Mexico, generally with the aid of bombs dropped from airplanes (or nowadays assassinations carried out by unmanned air vehicles), perhaps the recent emergence and rapid spread on the stage of history of the horrifying direct, primitive and extreme forms of violence indiscriminately targeting the "other" at the slightest pretext, should not come as a surprise. This escalation of violence from which hundreds of war-lords benefit, is not even pausing for a reconstruction for which the international construction companies are hungering, but steaming ahead while only the weapons industry keeps profiting.

Holding out only the latter form of violence and trying to turn the fear it spreads all over the world into a politics of exclusion, revulsion, "Islamo-phobia" and xenophobia in general, is the most successful operation of "manufacturing consent" since the selling of the Cold War. Nevertheless, there is a truth of which a small and rather ineffective minority of objectors, who refuse to consent, are aware: overwhelming violence is implicit in a world where hundreds of millions of children go hungry, while food stocks are destroyed to keep the prices high; where the livelihood of hundreds of millions of peasants are to be abolished by trade agreements putting their trade channels under the monopoly of international corporations; where the very existence of mankind is being threatened by dependence on carbon based energy sources under the control of energy giants and Asiatic and Middle Eastern tyrants. And this implicit violence goes hand in hand with and complements the two more explicit forms of violence mentioned above.

The "new," immediate, barbaric violence which has emerged in the Middle East and Africa, and the fact that this form of barbarism has now been reigning over a territory of the size of England and over eight millions of people for years, should be approached as one of the manifestations of a "return to the Middle Ages," of which Umberto Eco and other European writers have been warning us for many years. Regarding this violence and barbarism as a global issue concerning the whole of humanity and civilization, rather than phenomenon that emanates from a particular ethnic or religious group, wherever it may have

found fertile ground, is one of the preconditions for dealing with it in an effective way.

Disregarding the share of the West and of Europe in the forms of violence of both yesterday and today, overlooking structural causes of the conflict, often leads to the labelling of an ethnic, religious or cultural identity group as "uncivilised, barbaric, violence prone", in an essentialist sense. Ignoring the role of the British-French-German policies in the Turkish-Greek relations in the 19th century, or the seeds of enmity sown between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus in a bid by England to perpetuate its control over the island in more recent history, can conveniently reduce the issue to the "temperament" of these peoples who occupy the most "Southern" positions in the North of the Mediterranean.

I would like to touch upon another interesting example. The "Europe and the Mediterranean" conference took place on the 24th of April 2015, the 100th anniversary of both the onset of the genocide perpetrated by the Young Turk administration against the Ottoman Armenians, as well as the defeat of the Allied naval forces who were repulsed from the Dardanelles by the Ottoman and German forces, at Gallipoli. The European, and especially the German media reported extensively on both anniversaries. With, however, interesting emphases and silences. For example, the serious German newspapers who underlined the role played by the German officers and guns in the defeat of the British and French naval forces, failed to mention the fact that more than 30 thousand German officers (from the level of army commander to intelligence officer) were posted in key position in Turkey at the time of the Armenian genocide, and that although reports of the ethnic cleansing and appeals for help were communicated to the German embassy and from there to Berlin, they were systematically ignored. Similarly, there was silence regarding the creation, on the part especially of England, France and the Tsarist Russia, of a convenient opportunity for the perpetrators of the genocide, by steering a people, who did not constitute a consensual majority in any extensive Ottoman territory, into a struggle for independence rather than one for greater freedoms, autonomy and security. The inhuman operation which was then staged resulted in the massacre by the Ottomans of hundreds of thousands of Armenians and the total ethnic annihilation of a million and a half Armenian citizens together with all their cultural and economic wealth.

I mention these facts not only as a historian, or a civil society activist who has for years been struggling for Turkish-Greek friendship, the building of a federative Cyprus in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, and the recognition of the Armenian genocide and the return of their rights to the victims. I am calling attention to these examples, to stress that similar interventions and extremely opportunistic manoeuvers continue to take place

in many countries in the South of the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, with increasingly irresponsible forays into various hornet's nests by the big war-lords of the world. Because I believe that, lasting steps towards mutual understanding and cooperation on both shores of the Mediterranean can only be taken within a framework which does not overlook the deep crisis of capitalism and the dead end into which neo-liberal policies have driven the world, and which is based on the principles of universalism rather than nationalism. We cannot mitigate those policies which continually are in need of inventing "new enemies," unless we expose the basis on which they rest. Without dealing with the structural factors involved, the creation of projects to cover up and pacify basic economic and social conflicts in the Mediterranean area, can at best serve short term ends.

To say that the internet created first Al Qaeda, and later IS, and other similar organizations is quite exaggerated, but does have a point. In Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somali, Sudan, Iraq and Syria, where all sorts of schooled and unschooled ignorance unites with thousand-year long conflicts, desperation, neglect, and oppression, and the conviction bred for many generations that all hopes will eventually be crushed by an unsurmountable wall, has created a time-bomb. A simple message based on Salafi rhetoric can turn into a manifesto, can be communicated to a large part of the world in seconds, can precipitate a hierarchically organized movement which in turn generates a collective wave of suicide affecting millions. It should be noted that the Ottomans also had to deal with Salafi uprisings, sometimes by force, at other times using negotiations, for more than a century and a half.

Unless the universalist, left, democratic wing of the civil societal movement, in all its manifestations, from environmentalist to human rights, from LGBT to consumer rights organizations, strongly challenges the existing order with the essential tenets of "liberty, equality, fraternity", enriching these ideals with 21st century demands in a way that has a powerful impact on wide sections of society, violent mass revolts of will continue to occupy our agenda. The creation of a new wave based on pluralistic participation and local dynamics, with sustainable international coordination, calls for a rigorous analysis of the experiences of post-Second WW movements as the peace movement, the human rights movement, the ecological movement, the feminist movement, the World Social Forum. All these movements have already succeeded in changing our world to an appreciable extent; however there is still the need for these movements to interact with each other and the large masses by the most advanced scientific means. This is the main message of my contribution to this meeting.

In 2004, in a workshop titled "Islamic Philanthropy and Civil Engagement", and organized by the Maecenata Institute in Berlin, I delivered a paper on the "New

Role of NGOs in Turkey", where I made three proposals for the universalist, left, democratic wing of the civil society movement. Although they are based on the concrete example of Turkey, these proposals may be generalized and brought up to date:

1. To prioritize contributions towards the democratization process in their respective fields of civil societal work: to make the state accountable in all its functions to the citizens, and to be the instrument and intermediary of the interaction of the state with all social actors and stake holders in all stages of the decision making process; advocacy of all types, including lobbying in the parliament and in the municipal councils, and the rapid and systematic dissemination of the reliable, uncensored, two directional information flow to the larger public, especially working masses, unprivileged sections of the society.

2. To possess a clear vision regarding the place and relationships of the country within the region and the world: playing a decisive role in the creation of a public space with the outer world which is not based on a neo-colonialist discourse, but on negotiated inter-cultural experience and full respect for socio-economic interests of the labouring masses of the country; furthering true dialogue, with not just respect for differences, but also the self-confidence and mutual willingness to change, to create cultural, social, economic and political forms of being and of expression that are new and viable, and for safeguarding them with a deep and mutual commitment.

3. To build a platform of human solidarity in all respective fields of work: strengthening the mutual respect and understanding between social groups and different ethnic, religious, cultural identities within and outside the borders of the country; drawing upon the positive side of heritage of thousands of years of coexistence in the country, as well as the universal values of humanism; battling to counter the dominant tendency of the formation of closed, isolated and angry sub-communities under conditions where neo-liberalism has destroyed the infrastructure of the welfare state, and haphazard privatisations have worsened the living conditions for a large section of the population; re-organisation of the philanthropic reflexes of the society in all areas, in new, secular and far-reaching forms, which transcend neighbourhood, kinship or religious affiliations.

A civil societal effort in all sectors, which can mobilize the largest sections of society with increasing determination in a struggle against neo-liberal policies and nationalism, and provide support for existing forms of struggle in an effective way, can lead to real and lasting steps towards understanding and solidarity between the North and South of the Mediterranean.

EUROPA BOTTOM-UP

ARBEITSPAPIERE ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT / EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY WORKING PAPERS